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Emotion regulation includes adaptive (e.g., reappraisal) and non-adaptive behaviors (e.g., 
avoidance) designed to alter ones’ affective responses. The central hypothesis is that emotional 
consciousness – being self-aware that you are currently in a particular emotional state – and 
emotion regulation share the same underlying brain mechanisms/networks. In addition, it is 
argued that the more appropriate dichotomy, in regard to non-adaptive and adaptive emotion 
regulation strategies, is dependent on whether they are unconscious or conscious (respectively), 
positing a two-system framework of emotion regulation. Evidence for the proposed framework 
draws and builds off of recent theories of higher-order emotional consciousness (LeDoux & 
Brown, 2017) and supported frameworks of fear/anxiety (LeDoux & Pine, 2016). The literature 
reviewed suggests that the difference between emotional consciousness and emotion regulation 
lies in the variations in recruitment of lower-order, subcortical networks and the higher-order 
interpretation by the same overarching general network of cognition. In the second portion, an 
empirical examination of this theory was conducted using neuroimaging and self-reported 
anxiety in a sample of youth. I provide evidence for my first hypothesis by identifying significant 
clusters of grey-matter thickness in the general linear analyses that qualitatively overlap with the 
general network of cognition proposed to underlie emotional consciousness. The second 
hypothesis was partially supported as grey-matter thickness of these regions of the PFC, but not 
amygdala volume, significantly related to self-reported anxiety. Next, it is demonstrated that this 
relationship was significantly moderated by youths’ structural connectivity. Post-hoc analyses 
indicated that PFC grey-matter cortical thickness had a significant indirect effect on the 
relationship between amygdala volume and youth’s self-reported anxiety. The current results 
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provide support for the central hypothesis that emotional consciousness and emotion regulation 






1.1. Emotion Regulation 
The ability to effectively regulate emotions is essential for an individual’s well-being. 
Emotions ebb and flow over time and are crucial for our survival; signaling when our attention is 
needed elsewhere while facilitating the updating of goal progress (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1990). 
However, our environment (external and internal), for better or for worse, is constantly changing; 
efficient and accurate updating of goal progress and emotional responses is essential for adaptive 
emotion regulation (Gross, 1999). Emotion regulation refers to adaptive (e.g., reappraisal 
problem solving), as well as long-term non-adaptive behavior (e.g., worry, rumination) to the 
inevitable fluctuations in affective responses (see Aldao, Nolen-Hoeksema, & Schweizer, 2010). 
It was once thought emotions influence behavior in an uncontrollable manner (Lyons, 1978). We 
now know that many stages of emotion processing are controllable. For instance, one can divert 
attention away from an emotional stimulus (e.g., Rothermund, Voss, & Wentura, 2008), reduce 
the physiological consequences of the emotions he or she is feeling (e.g., Porges, 2007), and/or 
cognitively reappraise a particular emotional experience (e.g., Gross, 1998). These processes are 
just a few examples of effortful (or conscious) emotion regulation strategies.  
 The amygdala is involved in a wide range of emotional processes. Broadly, elevated 
amygdala responses to emotional stimuli appear to reflect emotional intensity or arousal 
regardless of whether the emotional valence is positive or negative (Anderson & Sobel, 2003; 
Small et al., 2003). Amygdala activity is involved in evaluating potentially threatening stimuli 
(Shin, Rauch, & Pitman, 2006), encoding emotionally salient stimuli (Canli et al., 2000), 





Mathew, & Charney, 2006; Olsson & Phelps, 2007; Schulkin, 2006), behavioral regulation 
(Dolan, 2007), and emotion regulation (Goldin et al., 2008; Ochsner et al., 2004).  
 Surprisingly, structural imaging studies have been inconsistent when linking amygdala 
volume to various affective disorders. Some researchers have found reduced amygdala volumes 
in youth with major depression (Rosso et al., 2005) but others have reported larger amygdala 
volumes in the same population (MacMillan et al., 2003). Research has indicated that bipolar 
youth typically display reduced amygdala volume (Blumberg et al., 2003; Pfeifer, Welge, 
Strakowski, Adler, & Delbello, 2003), but more recent research suggests that this may be, at least 
partially, attributed to a history of pharmacotherapy (i.e., lithium; Savitz et al., 2010). The 
literature in pediatric anxiety has also been equivocal (see De Bellis et al., 2000; Milham et al., 
2005). Notably for the present study, in healthy youth amygdala volume has been found to be 
negatively (Blackmon et al., 2011), as well as positively related to amygdala volume across 
development (Albaugh et al., 2017). What accounts for these equivocal findings regarding 
amygdala grey-matter and negative affect?  
 One potential explanation for the discrepant findings list above is that the amygdala 
participates in emotion related processes as one element in a network of regions that also 
includes top-down frontoparietal areas associated with emotion regulation. Thus, it is not the 
amygdala volume alone that predicts emotional dysregulation but rather the relationship between 
amygdala volume and the grey matter makeup of cortical areas associated with emotion 
regulation. There is much functional evidence that frontoparietal areas are related to the 
amygdala, and to emotional reactivity more generally, as a function of their involvement in 
emotion regulation (Amting, Greening, & Mitchell, 2010; Greening, Osuch, Williamson, & 





1.2. Aims and Purpose 
Emotion regulation underlies nearly all diagnostic categories (Aldo et al., 2010), where 
adaptive emotion regulation is associated with better mental health (Gross & Muñoz, 1995), 
improved physical health (Sapolsky, 2007), healthier interpersonal relationships (Murray, 2005), 
and better work performance (Diefendorff, Hall, Lord, & Strean, 2000). Despite its 
transdiagnostic importance, and a large increase in emotion regulation research over the past 
decade, there is surprising lack of continuity within the field (see Gross, 2013). The confusion in 
the literature partially stems from the dubious distinction between emotion and emotion 
regulation, as well as poorly integrated literatures (e.g., clinical, neuroscience, emotion 
processing, and emotion regulation). For instance, it is not clear what constitutes emotion 
regulation versus other forms of emotional processing (Koole, 2009), and there is even dispute 
what defines an emotion (see Izard, 2007). Some view emotion generation and emotion 
regulation as not being mutually exclusive (see Gross & Barrett, 2011; Ochsner et al., 2009); 
experts in the field refer to the distinction as being “blurry at best” (pg. 3, Ochsner, Silvers, & 
Buhle, 2012; Ochsner et al., 2009) and note it is unclear ‘‘where an emotion ends, and regulation 
begins’’ (pg. 308, Davidson, 1998). This is further compounded by differences in terminology, 
level of analysis, and measurement (Izard, 2007; Nigg, 2017). By definition, an emotional state 
cannot last forever – every emotion one has experienced has been regulated in some way. 
Despite difficulty distinguishing these constructs they are frequently modeled independently.  
Broadly, the aim of the dissertation is to review the literatures on emotional processing 
among various fields by providing evidence for a two-system framework of emotion regulation 
that scaffolds off of two similar theories of emotional consciousness (LeDoux & Brown, 2017) 





dissertation is to extend these two dominate theories of emotion with the hope that it will help 
integrate the fields of clinical psychology and neuroscience literatures. Utilizing neuroimaging 
and reported anxiety, I examine my central theoretical hypothesis. 
 
1.2.1. Theoretical Overview 
The dissertation is divided into two portions. First, a theoretical overview is followed by 
an empirical examination of this theoretical viewpoint. In the first portion, my central theoretical 
hypothesis is that emotional consciousness – being self-aware that you are currently in a 
particular emotional state – and emotion regulation share the same underlying brain 
networks/mechanisms. In addition, it is hypothesized that when evaluating the adaptiveness of 
emotion regulation strategies (i.e., non-adaptive or adaptive) the more appropriate dichotomy is 
between unconscious (termed type- or level-one throughout) and conscious (termed type- or 
level-two throughout) emotion regulation (respectively). Similar to theories of emotional 
consciousness (LeDoux & Brown, 2017) and an empirically supported framework of fear/anxiety 
(LeDoux & Pine, 2016), the differences between emotional consciousness and emotion 
regulation lies in the recruitment of lower-order, subcortical networks and their interpretation by 
higher-order structures. Evidence for this hypothesis will come from psychological neuroscience 
literatures and allows for the easy extension of LeDoux and Pine’s (2016) two-system 
framework of fear/anxiety to one of emotion regulation. The review will end by positing specific 
circuits within the network as being type-one emotion regulation – often called emotion 
reactivity/responsivity/sensitivity – or type-two emotion regulation (i.e., effortful strategies). It 
should be noted early that the distinction made between conscious and unconscious processes is 





& Williams, 2006); however, the conceptual distinction is important as it overlaps nicely with 
(and has direct implications for) the framework and theory that will be central to the current 
review. Given their intertwined nature, a framework of emotion regulation that scaffolds off 
dominate theories of emotional processing (i.e., LeDoux & Brown, 2017; LeDoux & Pine, 2016) 
has the potential to orient these two overlapping fields. Prior to going forward, it is important to 
define the terminology used, as well as review the two-system framework of fear/anxiety 
(LeDoux & Pine, 2016).  
 
1.2.2. Empirical Support for A Two-System Framework 
In the second portion of this dissertation, preliminary evidence will be provided for the 
two-system framework of emotion regulation. Specifically, I first look to determine regions of 
cortical thickness that are significantly associated with amygdala volume in a sample of typically 
functioning youth. I go on to examine whether this relationship is moderated by youths’ 
structural connectivity, linking grey-matter thickness (i.e., regions that correlated amygdala 
volume) and subcortical areas (i.e., amygdala volume) with self-reported anxiety. In my 
exploratory analyses, a test of indirect effects was conducted. I examined whether the 
relationship between amygdala volume and anxiety is indirectly related once restrictive variance 
is accounted for by regions of grey-matter cortical thickness (thought to be associated with 
emotion regulation). Final evidence is provided for an indirect effect, by the follow-up analyses 
examining whether amygdala volume and self-reported anxiety is moderated by cortical 
thickness in areas associated with emotion regulation. Given the ambiguity in the literature, 









Emotion regulation is often divided into effortful, conscious, deliberate actions (termed 
type-two throughout; see LeDoux & Pine, 2016; Nigg, 2017) and noneffortful, unconscious, 
nondeliberate actions (termed type-one throughout). Diagnostically agnostic terms outlined by 
Nigg (2017) will be used when needing to differentiate among emotion regulation: type-one 
(non-effortful, unconscious, etc.) and type-two (effortful, conscious, etc.). Emotion regulation 
will be defined broadly as regulatory actions used to alter ones’ behavior, physiological 
responses, and/or subjective experience. This includes both type-two, conscious emotion 
regulation strategies (e.g., problem-solving, cognitive reappraisal, mindfulness), as well as type-
one, or unconscious emotion regulation (i.e., regulatory mechanisms that operate automatically 
and outside of one’s awareness; see Bargh & Williams 2007).  
Often emotional reactivity/responsivity/sensitivity (i.e., automatic behavioral and 
physiological changes in response to neutral or negative stimuli) is used to refer to type-one 
emotion regulation. They are identical semantically, but conceptually different. For instance, the 
emotion reactivity literature tends to focus on the change in an individuals’ emotion reactivity 
over development. Here, it is argued that a more helpful way to view the same phenomenon 
would be to focus on the rise and changes in type-two emotion regulation (and its interaction 







1.3. Two-System Neuroscience Framework of Fear (LeDoux & Pine, 2016) 
LeDoux and Pine (2016) begin the journey of bridging the emotion-emotion regulation 
gap with their two-system neuroscience framework of fear. The framework provides evidence 
for the distinction and independence between the two threat systems. The first-system is thought 
to be primarily subcortical (e.g., sensory system, amygdala, bed nucleus of the stria terminalis, 
and striatum). The first-system leads to behavioral responses (i.e., the nucleus acumens 
facilitating escape and avoidance behaviors; Delgado, Jou, LeDoux, & Phelps, 2009; Schlund, 
Hudgins, Magee, & Dymond, 2013) and physiological changes in the brain and body – type-one, 
automatic, and non-effortful, termed defensive behaviors (i.e., DFN). LeDoux and Pine (2016) 
delineate specific neural correlates of the DFN, which gives rise to defensive behaviors and 
physiological changes. This first-system serves as the primary source of type-one emotion 
regulation, as the efficiency of the self-regulating lower-order process will determine if the 
combination of sensory input becomes a subjective conscious emotional state (see Figure 1.1). 
 The second system is posited to be an independent, higher-order cortical system that 
facilitates the subjective experience of emotion depending on the subcortical input (e.g., DFN). 
Specifically, LeDoux and Pine (2016) suggest that the GNC, which gives rise to perceptual (non-
emotional) conscious experience (Craig, 2009; Dehaene, Changeux, Naccache, Sackur, & 
Sergent, 2006; Frith & Dolan, 1996; Frifth, Perry, & Lumer, 1999; Lau & Passingham, 2006; 
Naccache, Blandin, & Dehaene, 2002; Rees & Frith, 2007), is not fundamentally different than 
the network that facilitates emotionally conscious experience. The key difference is in variation 
of the lower-order, subcortical input (e.g., autobiographical memory input, sensory systems, 







Figure 1.1. The two-system framework of emotion/emotion regulation. Note the difference 
between an emotional, non-emotional state of consciousness, as well as conscious (i.e., type-two) 
and unconscious (i.e., type-one) emotion regulation, is accounted for by the kinds of inputs 
processed by the GNC. Solid lines show network interactions that are especially important in 
emotional states. Underlined text indicates states/events that occur during emotional but not 
nonemotional experiences. See main text for additional details. Adapted from LeDoux and 
Brown’s (2017) figure. 
 
Evidence for the independence of the two-system (e.g., DFN and GNC) framework 
comes from a number of areas of research supporting the distinction between type-one 
(unconscious) and type-two (conscious) emotion regulation. While the first system (e.g., DFN) 
gives rise to type-one, unconscious defensive behaviors/physiological changes, the second 
system is needed to interpret this subcortical input to allow for the subjective experience of fear. 
Support for this notion is vast. For instance, those with amygdala damage do not demonstrate 
bodily reactions to threats but still report fear (Jack & Roepstorff, 2003; Metcalfe & Terrace, 
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individuals demonstrate amygdala responses to threats (Hariri, Tessitore, Mattay, Fera, 
Weinberger, 2002; Morris et al., 1999), those with anxiety disorders demonstrate exaggerated 
amygdala activation (Mowrer, 1960; Panksep, Fuchs, & Iacobucci, 2011; Perusini & Fanselow, 
2015). Moreover, fear and anxiety do not correlate well with physiological and behavioral 
measures (Jack & Shallice, 2001; Frith et al., 1999; Rosenthal, 1986). It has also been repeatedly 
demonstrated that subliminal threats elicit amygdala activity and trigger physiological and 
behavioral responses, but not feelings of fear (Baars & Franklin, 2003; Duhaene, 2014; Hariri et 
al., 2002; Jacobs & Silvanto, 2015; Kihlstrom, 1987; Morris et al., 1999; Overgaard & Sandberg, 
2014). Finally, literature on patients with blind spots also support the two-system framework, 
where they exhibit amygdala activation to threat, defensive behaviors, and changes in 
physiology, despite not having conscious awareness of the threating stimuli (Lau & Passingham, 
2006; Persaud et al., 2011). Collectively, these findings imply that the processing of threat 
information by the DFN is dissociable from the conscious awareness of threat, which requires a 
higher-order cortical interpretation (i.e., GNC). Importantly, it also suggests that conscious 
awareness of threats occur in the same higher-order structures that conscious awareness of non-
emotional stimuli do, differing on subcortical input. 
Neuroscience research on conscious experience has consistently provided evidence that 
the GNC is comprised of the pPL, IN, ACC, mOFC, lOFC, vlPFC, dlPFC, dmPFC, and vmPFC 
cortices (see Figures 1.1 & 1.2A; LeDoux & Pine, 2016). For instance, during subliminal or 
masking procedures, while areas of the visual cortex are activated, participants display activation 
in the aforementioned areas of the GNC only when they report the stimulus present (Craig, 2009; 
Craig, 2010; Dehaene, 2014; Dehaene et al., 2006; Frith et al., 1999; Frith & Dolan, 1996; Lau & 





blindsight patients, where the GNC is only activated when they report consciously seeing the 
stimulus (Lau & Passingham, 2006; Persaud et al., 2011). Moreover, The GNC involves regions 
associated with attention, working memory, and metacognition, providing theoretical support 
(see, Dehaene, 2014; Dehaene et al., 2006; Del Cul, Dehaene, Reyes, Bravo, Slachevsky, 2009; 
Fleming, Huijgen, & Dolan, 2012; Frith et al., 1999; Frith & Dolan, 1996; Goldman-Rakic, 
1999; Lau & Passingham, 2006; Miller & Cohen, 2001; Naccache et al., 2002; Pascual-Leone & 
Walsh, 2001; Rees & Frith, 2007; Vuilleumier et al., 2008). 
 
 
Figure 1.2. (A) The structures posited to comprise the GNC, as outlined by LedDoux and Pine 
(2015) and LeDoux and Brown (2016). (B) The same structures, some parcellated, to note which 
areas comprise the GNC-1 or type-one, unconscious, emotion regulation (white) and those that 
are part of the GNC-2 or type-two, conscious, emotion regulation (blue). 
 
A dominant interpretation of these findings comes from the higher-order theory, which 
suggests that subjective experience arises from set circuitry, which supports thoughts about 
lower-order information (Cleeremans, Timmermans, & Pasquali, 2007; Cohen & Dennett, 2011; 
Dehaene et al., 2006). While attention, working memory, and their underlying circuits support 































2012; Carruthers, 2005; Firth & Dolan, 1996; Kouider, De Gardelle, Sackur, & Dupoux, 2010). 
Thus, an additional layer of cognitive representation, likely also involving the frontal cortex, is 
required beyond nonconscious representation in working memory (Cohen & Dennett, 2011).  
 
1.4. Higher-Order Theory of Consciousness (LeDoux & Brown, 2017) 
LeDoux and Brown’s (2017) higher-order theory of emotional consciousness has its 
foundation in LeDoux and Pine’s (2016) framework, importantly adopting the same terminology. 
It extends the two-system framework by incorporating psychological literature to posit a 
modified higher-order theory of emotional consciousness. They begin with agreeing that the 
underlying brain mechanisms that give rise to perceptual (non-emotional) consciousness are not 
fundamentally different than those that give rise to emotional consciousness. LeDoux and Brown 
(2017) go on to suggest that the subcortical regions that receive primary sensory signals from the 
body (Damasio, 1999), memory systems (Squire & Zola-Morgan, 1991), and the visual system 
(Van Essen, Anderson, & Felleman, 1992) are all involved in the first-order representations that 
indirectly influence higher-order assembly of conscious feelings by the GNC (see Figure 1.1). 
Thus, the subjective experience of fear, within this framework, is modulated by the DFN, along 
with the subcortical body sensing network, memory, and visual systems, but directly arises from 
other independent higher-order frontoparietal networks integrating the information (i.e., the 
GNC). 
Directly in line with the central hypothesis, LeDoux and Brown (2017) delineate two 
GNCs: a first GNC is thought to integrate subcortical input outside of an individuals’ conscious 
awareness, and a second GNC that receives this input and gives rise to the conscious experience 





Identifying sub-networks, or circuits, that comprise the GNC-1 and GNC-2 will be central to the 
current framework of emotion regulation. First, however, the differences between these 
intertwined GNCs need to be reviewed.  
LeDoux and Brown (2017) proposed that phenomenally conscious experiences result 
from lower-order representations that originate from the GNC-1. Specifically, the GNC-1 then 
creates a higher-order representation of the first-order representation outside of an individual’s 
awareness, which can affect behavior (e.g., Siegel & Gallagher, 2015). The GNC-2 is then 
needed to incorporate information from lower-order systems and GNC-1, leading to a higher-
order representation of the first nonconscious representation that is now. The integration of this 
information in GNC-2 allows for the emotional experience, and as argued here, emotion 
regulation, into an individuals’ awareness.  
LeDoux and colleagues (2016; 2017) argue that the GNC-1 serves as the basis for the 
higher-order representation of the first-order representation produced by the visual cortex with 
input from a number of subcortical regions (e.g., amygdala fear network). Actively attending to, 
and a deliberate focus on, one’s emotional state (i.e., active introspection) requires an additional 
higher-order representation (i.e., a higher-order representation [active introspection] of the first 
higher-order representation [passive introspection], termed a higher-order representation of a 
higher-order representation; now occurring within the cortical structures of GNC-2). 
Furthermore, it was theorized that when the type-one, nonconscious higher-order representations 
(i.e., leading to defensive fear behaviors, e.g., increased arousal), along with the higher-order 
representation of the higher-order representation (i.e., being able to report fear if asked), occur 
within unconscious working memory and conscious working memory, respectively (Bor & Seth, 





Taken together, perceptual (non-emotional) and emotional consciousness both require the 
incorporation of higher-order representation of lower, subcortical information by the GNC-2; 
differences in consciousness (non-emotional and emotional) arise from the subcortical input and 
higher-order representations. For instance, when the first, type-one higher-order representation 
within the GNC-1 includes subcortical input about the self (e.g., through autobiographical 
knowledge), the GNC-2 a self-relevant higher-order representation manifests (i.e., one is able to 
report being afraid when asked). Finally, when the third higher-order representation (i.e., a 
higher order representation of two previous higher-order representations) are integrated in the 
GNC-2 and include subcortical input regarding schemas, autobiographical memory, input from 
the DFN, and sensory networks, a similar self-relevant conscious awareness of being afraid can 
occur (e.g., having the thought “I am feeling afraid right now”).  
 
1.5. Theoretical Hypotheses 
Although broad structures are mentioned, a comprehensive review of the literature 
extending the theory of emotional consciousness to emotion regulation is sorely needed. The 
scaffolding nature of these parallel processes makes a unifying theory, pulling from 
psychological, neuroscience, and biological sciences, intuitive and potentially useful. In addition, 
As shown in Figure 1.2B, the theorized neural circuits or substructures which comprise GNC-2 
(and GNC-1) are not fundamentally different than those involved in type-two (and type-one) 
emotion regulation. However, the regulatory strategy used will depend on the selective 






A review of the functional literature (e.g., Silvers et al., 2015; 2016) supports the notion 
that the GNC-2 and type-two emotion regulation strategies heavily rely on the dlPFC, vlPFC, 
and dmPFC cortices, as well as the dACC, aIN, and portions of the OFC. When reviewing the 
literature, the GNC-1 and type-one emotion regulation are supported by the vmPFC, portions of 
the OFC, amygdala nuclei, and pIN. Extendedly, the proposed two-system framework of 
emotion regulation aims to provide evidence for specific structures and circuits within GNC that 
may be related to specific type-one and type-two emotion regulation strategies.  
While, some have conceptualized emotion regulation as being on a continuum; from 
explicit, conscious, or effortful to implicit, unconscious, effortless, or automatic (Mauss, Bunge, 
& Gross, 2007), reviews of type-one and type-two emotion regulation support the extension of 
the two-system framework of fear/anxiety to type-one and type-two emotion regulation – 
hypothesized as distinct, but obviously interact (e.g., changing behavior and physiology can 
indirectly modulate the subjective states of fear because of the change in subcortical input; see 
Gyurak, Gross, & Etkin, 2011). For example, priming individuals with an emotional goal (e.g., 
stable, restrain) leads to reduced anger after an experimental provocation, despite being outside 
of participants awareness (Mauss, Cook, & Gross, 2007; Williams et al., 2006). These results 
indicate that nonconscious, type-one emotion regulation, such as goal direction, can aid one in 
controlling emotional states without effort or conscious awareness, which provides further 
evidence for their distinction.  
People engage in numerous behaviors to regulate their emotions (Parkinson & Totterdell, 
1999), where it could be argued that all the behaviors one engages are simply various efforts to 
regulate an emotional response. Emotion regulation can fall into four categories depending on 





emotions (Quoidbach, Berry, Hansenne, & Mikolajczak, 2010), increase negative emotions 
(Sutton, 1991), and to decrease positive emotions (Gruber, Mauss, & Tamir, 2011). For instance, 
one may suppress a laugh during a funeral (i.e., decrease positive emotions), think of a happy 
memory when missing a loved one (i.e., increase positive emotions), become angry to increase 
adrenaline before a sporting event (i.e., increase negative emotions), or inhibit a frown during a 
date (i.e., decrease positive emotions).  
Although on a continuum and not categorical, conceptualizing emotion regulation as top-
down and bottom-up processes can be useful in better understanding emotion and distinguishing 
the GNCs. Top-down processes are defined as being deliberate (i.e., type-two, effortful), slow, 
sequential, require working memory, but limited by capacity (Nigg, 2017).  In contrast, bottom-
up processes are automatic, stimulus-provoked, and have a quick onset (i.e., type-one, emotion 
reactivity), but are posited by some to not require working memory (Nigg, 2017). While top-
down processes can activate or suppresses bottom-up responses (Avital-Cohen & Tsal, 2016), 
bottom-up regulation can alter behavior via priming, effecting top-down processes (Verbruggen, 
McAndrew, Weidemann, Stevens & McLaren, 2016). 
Importantly, cognitive reappraisal – the most commonly studied method of effortful 
(type-one) emotion regulation – is often split into studies of distancing and cognitive 
restructuring. A large problem in the field is that these methods are taken as being synonymous, 
when there are many reasons that this should not be the case. Unlike distancing, cognitive 
restructuring is central to cognitive-behavioral therapy, which is an empirically supported 
treatment for anxiety and depression (see Hollon & Ponniah, 2010). While distancing – another 
word for internal distraction or possibly avoidance – can reduce cognitive fixation (e.g., 





acute, distressing situation (Gerin et al., 2006) it can be maladaptive strategy in the long-term. 
For example, when participants were not allowed to ruminate (versus those that were allowed to 
ruminate), they demonstrated increased physiological responses to the stressor a week later 
(Glynn, Christenfeld, & Gerin, 2007). Overall, mentally processing the experience seems to 
confer some long-term benefits. In contrast, cognitive restructuring is thought to create schematic 
change (or changes in beliefs) that have been found to have long-term positive effects (see Clark 
2013). 
 
1.5.1. The Process Model (Gross, 1998) 
The Process Model proposed by Gross (1998) is an information-processing model, where 
each step in the emotion-generative process is a potential point of regulation. Five points were 
identified that reflect families of emotion regulation processes: situation selection, situation, 
modification, attentional deployment, cognitive change, and response modulation (Gross & 
Thompson, 2007). The model is situated in time, where movement from left (situation selection) 
to right (response modulation) reflect movement through time within the emotion-generative 


































Figure 1.3. (A) Gross’ (1998) Process Model specifying the four points of emotion regulation, 
with an example of emotion regulation processes at each stage. (B) Gross’ (1998) Process Model 
and the complementary two-system framework of emotion regulation. All four stages, with eight 
substages, of emotion/emotion regulation are outlined, with an example of emotion regulation 
processes at each stage; processes in boxes represent type-one emotion regulation (i.e., 
unconscious, GNC-1) where emotion regulation strategies (i.e., type-two, GNC-2) are not boxed. 
 
 Briefly, situation selection, an individual can control the appraisal process before it ever 
begins by choosing a particular context to minimize the emotional burden. Situation modification 
entails attempts to directly change the situation to modify its emotional impact. The first two 
emotion regulation strategies modify appraisal inputs, thus controlling the cues available to 
generate specific emotions (Gross, 2001). An individual can divert their attention to 
environmental cues that promote desired emotions and/or ignore cues that promote negative 
emotions. Attentional deployment is important as it serves as a gate, allowing particular cues into 
the reappraisal process, while making others not possible. Cognitive change includes altering the 
meaning of a specific stimuli. Cognitive reappraisal, the most common form of cognitive change, 
includes changing beliefs about stimuli in an effort to decrease negative and/or increase positive 
emotions. Finally, response modulation only affects the behavioral output of the reappraisal 






























































process. Therefore, response modification, such as behavioral suppression (e.g., hiding a 
grimace) or augment behavioral manifestations (e.g., slowly approach the stimulus).  
Extending the process model to the higher-order theory of emotion regulation, all five 
points of the emotion regulation process could be regarded as type-one or type-two regulatory 
processes, depending on subcortical input (e.g., context) and higher-order connectivity (Gold, 
Morey, & McCarthy, 2015). For example, an individual may consciously choose not to go to the 
school dance due to fear or unconsciously avoid a particular stimulus (“I just don’t want to go”), 
where both relate to subcortical and cortical activity within the same networks (i.e., DFN and 
GNC). By definition, cognitive change may be an exception, as this point typically refers to type-
two emotion regulation strategies one can use in response to a current appraisal (i.e., the 
byproduct of type-one emotion regulation). However, some view that cognitive reappraisal can 
occur outside one’s conscious awareness (e.g., Williams et al., 2006), as one does not 
consciously choose to be in denial or maybe to use humor in an uncomfortable situation, for 
example. The current two-system framework of emotion regulation emphasizes the difference 
between whether a particular emotion regulation strategy (of the five) is type-one or type-two. 
This vantage point will be shown to be advantageous and complementary to the Process Model, 
indicating the importance of a two-system framework of fear regulation (see Figure 1.3).  
 The Process Model also posits that different forms, or families, of emotion regulation 
have different consequences, as they are deployed at different stages of the emotion-generative 
process. Gross (2013) captures this idea with an illustration contrasting suppression (i.e., part of 
the response modulation family, in this case type-one) and reappraisal (i.e., part of the cognitive 
change family, in this case type-two). He notes that while both are commonly used to down-





decrease emotion-related behaviors (e.g., altering your facial expression to not appear scared) 
while emotionally aroused. On the other hand, reappraisal is cognitively oriented, where an 
individual attempt to think about a situation to alter his/her emotional response, often termed 
cognitive restructuring (see Webb, Miles & Sheeran, 2012 for a review).  
Gross (2013) continues the juxtaposition between suppression and reappraisal by noting 
affective, cognitive, and social differences the use of these two strategies can have. Suppression 
decreases positive, but not negative emotional experiences, increased physiological response, 
and greater activation in subcortical emotion-generative regions (e.g., amygdala). Conversely, 
cognitive reappraisal has been shown to decrease negative emotional experiences, increase 
positive emotional experiences, does not affect arousal, and leads to reduced activity in emotion-
generative regions (e.g., amygdala; see Gross & Thompson, 2007). Where suppression leads to 
worse memory, reappraisal either has no effect or improves memory and performance (Jamieson, 
Mendes, Blackstock, & Schmader, 2010; Richards & Gross, 2000). Socially, suppression is less 
tolerated by partners and is associated with increased blood pressure, whereas reappraisal is not 
associated with adverse social consequences (Butler et al., 2003).  
Aldao, Nolen-Hoeksema, and Schweizer (2010) provide further support for this notion in 
their meta-analysis of six emotion regulation strategies (i.e., acceptance, avoidance, problem 
solving, reappraisal, rumination, and suppression) and symptoms of four psychopathologies (i.e., 
anxiety, depression, eating, and substance-related disorders). They found large effect sizes for 
rumination, medium to large for avoidance, problem-solving, and suppression, and a small to 
medium effect size for reappraisal and acceptance. In addition, clinical versus normative samples 
significantly moderated these relationships. Given the prominence of reappraisal and acceptance 





these results suggest that the presence of a maladaptive emotion regulation strategy is much more 
deleterious than the absence of an adaptive emotion regulation strategy.  
As mentioned, adaptive and maladaptive emotion regulation strategies are often 
differentiated in the literature. For example, reappraisal, problem-solving, and acceptance are 
seen as adaptive (Gross, 1998; Gratz & Roemer, 2004). In contrast, maladaptive strategies are 
thought to underlie models of depression and anxiety (Beck & Clark, 1988), which led to 
cognitive-behavioral therapies focus on teaching reappraisal skills (Beck, Rush, Shaw & Emery, 
1979). While adaptive emotion regulation strategies tend to be type-two, whereas maladaptive 
emotion regulation strategies are often type-one (do you choose to worry?), this is not always the 
case. For example, type-one (unconscious) reappraisal of goals is thought to be associated with 
positive outcomes (e.g., Williams et al., 2006) and type-two emotion regulation strategy of using 
humor is associated with poorer outcomes (Samson & Gross, 2012). Therefore, the two-system 





































Figure 1.4. (A) Gross’ (1998) Process Model specifying that it hypothesizes that emotion 
regulation strategies have worse consequences over time (or over the four stages of emotion 
regulation), with an example of emotion regulation processes at each stage. Gross’ (1998) 
Process Model and the two-system framework of emotion regulation. All four stages and eight 
substages of emotion/emotion regulation are outlined, with an example of emotion regulation 
processes at each stage, and the typical consequences. 
 
Problem-solving is a type-one, conscious (effortful) attempt to modulate a situation or 
consequences; typically involving specific actions directed at solving the problem. Evidence for 
problem-solving as an adaptive strategy comes from studies finding low problem-solving is 
associated with many internalizing disorders (e.g., Kant, D’Zurilla, & Maydeu-Olivares, 1997) 
and is a component taught during cognitive-behavioral therapy (e.g., Beck et al., 1979). 
Mindfulness is a regulation strategy that involves the non-judgmental acceptance of emotions 
(Bishop et al., 2004). Thus, it is conceptualized as a non-elaborative, non-judgmental, present-
centered awareness and acceptance of thoughts, feelings, and sensations (Kabat-Zinn, 2003). 
High acceptance has been found to produce good outcomes (e.g., Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 
1999), where low-levels of acceptance have long been associated with various internalizing (e.g., 































































McLaughlin, Mennin, & Farach, 2007) and personality disorders (Gratz, Rosenthal, Tull, & 
Lejuez, 2006).  
 Maladaptive regulation strategies such as suppression and avoidance are risk factors for 
anxiety, depression, and substance abuse (Carver et al., 1989; Folkman & Lazarus, 1980). While 
Gross’ model (1998) emphasizes suppression of emotional expression; providing evidence of the 
long-term negative outcomes (e.g., increased physiological arousal; see Gross & Thompson, 
2007; John & Gross, 2004). Others have focused on cognitive suppression (Wenzlaff & Wegner, 
2000), providing substantial evidence that effortful suppression of thoughts increases their 
accessibility (Wegner & Erber, 1992; Wegner, Schneider, Carter, & White, 1987) and 
physiological arousal (Wegner, Broome, & Blumberg, 1997).  
 Historically, avoidance has been conceptualized in the behavioral domain. Mowrer 
(1947) posited the two-stage theory of fear, where 1) fear is learned through classical 
conditioning and 2) through (behavioral) avoidance extinction cannot occur, maintaining the fear 
response through operant conditioning. This model has been applied to post-traumatic stress 
disorder (Foa & Kozak, 1986), panic disorder (Barlow, Craske, Cerny, & Klosko, 1989), and 
specific phobia (Merckelbach, de Jong, Muris, & van den Hout, 1996). Experiential avoidance, 
in contrast, is the avoidance (or suppression) of thoughts, emotions, physiological responses, 
memories, and urges (Hayes et al., 1999). Hayes and colleagues proposed acceptance as the 
alternative to experiential avoidance, central to the treatment they developed, acceptance and 
commitment therapy (Hayes et al., 1999). 
 Instead of suppressing unwanted cognitions or emotions, some individuals repetitively 
focus on the cause of their negative emotions, and the undesirable outcomes (i.e., rumination; 





anticipated adverse event in the future) is associated with a tendency to attempt to control and 
avoid negatively evaluated internal experiences (i.e., emotion regulation; Roemer, Salters, Raffa, 
& Orsillo, 2005) and with a tendency to react to emotional responses as if they are threatening 
(i.e., emotional reactivity; Roemer et al., 2005; Mennin et al., 2005). Worry is hypothesized to 
negatively reinforced by diminishing negative emotions and physiological arousal (Borkovec, 
Alcaine, & Behar, 2004; Borkovec & Hu, 1990; Wells & Papageorgiou, 1995), and a 
conditioned response activated by negative emotional states (Startup & Davey, 2001). Worry is 
thought to be Clinical and subclinical populations can be differentiated on their self-reported 
reason to worry, where the latter reports using this strategy to distract themselves from other 
negative topics.  
Both rumination and worry facilitate the avoidance of emotional processing, leading to 
less adaptive functioning and increased distress. Individuals reporting chronic rumination and/or 
worry state they use the strategy to solve the problem at hand, despite both being negatively 
related to problems solving (Dugas, Letarte, Rhéaume, Freeston, & Ladouceur, 1995; 
Papageorgiou & Wells, 2003). For instance, worry has been found to be related to problem 
orientation (i.e., emotional reactivity; immediate cognitive-behavioral-affective reactions to 
problematic situations) but not to problem-solving skills (i.e., adaptive emotion regulation; 
creating goals, brain storming solutions, making decisions, and implementing the solutions; 
Dugas et al., 1995). Unsurprisingly, rumination also interferes with good problem solving and 
has been found to foster indecisiveness (Ward, Lyubomirsky, Sousa, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003).  
 Taken together, it is clear that not all emotion regulation strategies are equal. When 
viewing it from a two-system framework, it appears that positive outcomes are associated with 





typically viewed as maladaptive, such as rumination, are adaptive if one is aware they are 
occurring, which is exactly what is found (Glynn et al., 2007). This viewpoint fits nicely with the 
literature and what is observed clinically as well. The developmental process hinders children’s 
ability to bring emotion regulation strategies within awareness (i.e., type-two), leaving them with 
nearly only type-one emotion regulation processes. Thus, explaining the difficulties of teaching 
cognitive restructuring or mindfulness to very young children, as well as their trouble reporting 
and managing their internal world (see Christophersen & VanScoyoc, 2013). While research has 
been able to delineate adaptive and maladaptive emotion regulation strategies, current evidence 
suggests a two-system framework. Emphasizing what strategies not to use (medium to large 
effect sizes) while teaching adaptive strategies (small to medium effect sizes) is certainly an 
avenue of future treatment research. 
 
1.6. The General Network of Cognition and Emotion Regulation 
Neuroimaging studies of these emotion regulation strategies (e.g., Otto, Misra, Prasad, & 
McRae 2014; Zilverstand, Parvaz, & Goldstein, 2017) map on to the GNC outlined by Ledoux 
and Brown (2017), where the various strategies differ only on lower-order, subcortical input. As 
seen in Figure 1.2A, they broadly implicate the pPL, IN, ACC, and a number of areas in the PFC 
(i.e., ventral-lateral, dorsal-lateral, orbital-lateral, orbital-medial, dorsal-medial, and ventral-
medial cortices). In terms of functional neuroimaging, these same regions are involved in type-
two emotion regulation strategies such as cognitive reappraisal (Zilverstand et al., 2017), active 
suppression (Goldin et al., 2008; Wyland, Kelley, Macrae, Gordon, & Heatherton, 2003), as well 





Jones, & Yim, 1980), rumination (Cooney, Joormann, Eugène Dennis, & Gotlib, 2010), and 
worry (Paulesu et al., 2010). 
Further evidence comes from the structural (i.e., cortical thickness, subcortical volumes) 
differences (and overlap) found between self-reported anxious apprehension (largely mapping on 
to type-two emotion regulation strategies such as worry) and anxious arousal (capturing type-one 
defensive behaviors/changes in physiology). In line with structures comprising the GNC, anxious 
apprehension, but not anxious arousal, correlated with clusters in the dlPFC, dmPFC and vlPFC, 
whereas anxious arousal, but not anxious apprehension, produced clusters in the aIN and the 
amygdala (Castagna et al., 2017). Again, these findings are congruent with the two-system 
framework of fear/anxiety (LeDoux & Pine, 2016). Interestingly, a conjunction analysis revealed 
the importance of a number of frontoparietal regions with strong relationships to both systems 
(Castagna et al., 2017). The overlap among the GNC and regions involved in emotion regulation, 
broadly, is fairly evident; however, my aim is to extend LeDoux and Brown’s (2017) distinction 
between GNC-1 and GNC-2. 
Support for my hypothesis is first provided by a review of the literature on the function of 
neurocognitive structures thought to comprise the GNC. It is suspected that the literature will 
support neural circuits or substructures that map on to the GNC-2 (and GNC-1), and that they are 
not fundamentally different than those involved in type-two (and type-one) emotion regulation. 
Each structure posited by LeDoux and Pine (2016) will be reviewed to highlight their function in 
emotion regulation. Evidence of their role in perceptual consciousness (Craig, 2009; Dehaene, 
Changeux et al., 2006; Frith & Dolan, 1996; Frifth et al., 1999; Lau & Passingham, 2006; 
Naccache et al., 2002; Rees & Frith, 2007) and emotional consciousness (LeDoux & Brown, 





Each paragraph will pull from functional imaging studies and meta-analyses, where the 
literature generally supports the notion that the GNC-2 and type-two emotion regulation 
strategies heavily rely on the dlPFC), vlPFC, dmPFC cortices, as well as the dACC, aIN, and 
portions of the OFC. The GNC-1 and type-one emotion regulation, in contrast, appear to be 
supported by the vmPFC, portions of the OFC, amygdala nuclei, and pIN. See Figure 1.2B. 
 
1.7. Neuroanatomy of Emotion and Emotion Regulation 
1.7.1. Posterior Parietal Lobe (pPL) 
When an individual is aware of a visual stimulus, PFC and pPL circuits are engaged; 
however, as awareness dissipates, the circuit is no longer recruited (Block, 2007; Rees & Frith, 
2007; Lau & Rosenthal, 2011; Rosenthal, 2005), which has been extended to threat awareness 
(Baars & Franklin, 2003; Dehaene, 2014; Block, 2007; Jacobs & Silvanto, 2015; Kihlstrom, 
1987; Morris et al., 2004; Overgaard et al., 2014). Functional imaging has consistently 
implicated the pPL, vlPFC, and superior temporal as regions involved in linguistic processing 
(Anderson & Phelps, 2002). These findings suggest that these regions are likely important in 
higher-order emotional consciousness (i.e., GNC-2) and regulation (i.e., type-two). Evidence 
supporting this claim comes from a meta-analysis where the pPL engagement was related to 
cognitive reappraisal (Zilverstand et al., 2017). Furthermore, Goldin et al. (2008), found pPL 
recruitment during two types of effortful (i.e., type two) emotion regulation strategies. Therefore, 








1.7.2. Insula (IN) 
The IN is broadly associated with internal bodily sensations and interoceptive 
representations that can substantialize into conscious awareness of one’s arousal (Craig, 2009). 
For instance, Critchley et al. (2004) found strong activity in the IN when participants were aware 
of their heart-beat, an interoceptive measure that correlates with individual subjective emotional 
awareness. A posterior-anterior IN cortex distinction is important, and likely explains why 
previous clinical literature has been, at times, equivocal. For instance, some find greater bilateral 
activation (along with the amygdala) to emotional faces in individuals’ prone to anxiety (when 
compared to anxiety-normative controls; Stein et al., 2007). Within a sample of clinically 
anxious participants and healthy controls, the aIN, specifically, shows hyper-reactivity in 
response to fearful faces, which also involves reduced connectivity with the lPFC (implicated in 
type-two emotion regulation). A recent, comprehensive meta-analysis, however, did not find 
evidence for differences in IN activity between those with social anxiety disorder and healthy 
controls when viewing faces (Gentilli et al., 2016).  
This discrepancy may stem from differential functions by the aIN and pIN. Interestingly, 
objective, unconscious representations of internal sensations are represented linearly in the dorsal 
pIN, but subjective (conscious) ratings of these interoceptive representations correlate with 
activation of the aIN and the adjacent OFC (Rolls, 2015; 2016). Moreover, the pIN has been 
implicated in heautoscopy (i.e., a dissociative experience of feeling as though one is in two 
bodies at once; Heydrich & Blanke, 2013). In contrast, the aIN is thought to receive input from 
the OFC and ACC (Price, 2006; 2007); the OFC and ACC decode and represent the reward and 
punishment-related signals that can produce autonomic (visceral) responses (Rolls, 2014; 2016). 





regulation strategies (e.g., Goldin et al., 2008). Together, this suggests that the integration of 
interoceptive information may occur in a posterior-anterior pattern.  
Four functional groups that comprise the IN shed light on its various functions. Kurth et 
al. (2010) identified sensorimotor, cognitive, social-emotional, and an olfacto-gustatory domain 
within the IN. They provided converging evidence for the current theory. The mid-posterior 
regions were found to be densely connected to primary and secondary sensory and motor areas. 
Therefore, it appears likely that the pIN is essential to the GNC-1, where it may integrate 
subcortical information from the DFN regarding behavioral and physiological arousal. In 
contrast, the anterior-dorsal regions have stronger connections with frontal regions (see 
Augustine, 1996), likely indicating its importance as a substructure of the GNC-2. Further 
evidence comes from literature demonstrating the robust relationship between the anterior-dorsal 
regions of the IN is part of the frontoparietal network, important in language processing, as well 
as working memory and attention tasks (Price, 2000). These processes directly overlap with 
type-two emotion regulation strategies such as cognitive reappraisal (i.e., language processing) 
and attentional deployment (i.e., attention).  
Taken together, a modest hypothesis would be that the pIN provides input on internal 
sensations, outside of one’s awareness (i.e., GNC-1) to the DFN (e.g., amygdala). In contrast, the 
aIN is posited to be important for emotional consciousness (GNC-2), as it provides input on 
arousal to higher-order cortical areas that give rise to emotional consciousness. (i.e., mPFC, aIN; 








1.7.3. Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC) 
 LeDoux and Pine (2017) specifically implicate the ACC as being central to the GNC. The 
ACC is known to play an important, albeit broad, role in higher-order appraisals and decision 
making (Bush et al., 1999; Mars et al., 2011). The function of the ACC directly maps on to type-
two emotion regulation strategies such as cognitive reappraisal. The focus will be on specific 
substructures of the ACC, as various parcellations demonstrate different functions that relate to 
the GNC-1 and GNC-2. 
Broadly, the ACC is a limbic structure correlated with pleasantness or unpleasantness of 
stimuli (Rolls, 2015). It receives strong input from the amygdala and OFC regarding value and 
outcome value representations. It has strong projections to the midcingulate cortex that facilitate 
action-outcome learning (Rolls, 2014). Some have suggested that the ACC mediates the 
orbitofrontal cortex representations of current and future value with behaviors (Rolls, 2015; 
2014). 
The ACC is typically parcellated by its ventral (i.e., pgACC and sgACC) and dorsal 
portions (i.e., dACC). (Etkin, Egner, & Kalisc, 2011; Vogt, Berger, & Derbyshire, 2003). 
Emotion-processing regions (e.g., amygdala, hypothalamus) have strong connectivity with the 
dACC and pgACC (Amaral et al., 1992; An et al., 1998; Beckmann et al., 2009; Chiba, 
Kayahara, & Nakano, 2001; Ghashghaei, Hilgetag, & Barbas, 2007; Rempel-Clower & Barbas). 
The dACC has the strongest connectivity with the premotor and lPFC (Bates & Goldman-Rakic, 
1993; Beckman et al., 2005). Overall, the pgACC and portions of the sgACC interact with lower-
order cortical structures (i.e., DFN) indicating that they likely are important structures in the 
GNC-1 and facilitate type-one emotion regulation. On the other hand, dACC communicates with 





follows that the dACC would predominantly be involved in emotional consciousness (GNC-2) 
and type-two emotion regulation. For this to be correct, functional neuroimaging studies should 
find differences among the subregions of the ACC that map on to type-one (and GNC-1) and 
type-two (and GNC-2). Activity in the dACC, specifically, has been correlated with fear-
conditioned skin conductance (Milad et al., 2007) and increased heart rate during social 
evaluation (Wager et al., 2009). Moreover, direct stimulation of the dACC creates the subjective 
state of fear (Meyer, McElhaney, Martin, & McGraw, 1973) – in line with the dACC being 
essential to the GNC-2. 
Where the dACC is associated with imminent threats, the pgACC and sgACC typically 
activate during a distal threat, extinction, and recall of extinction (Etkins et al., 2011). Moreover, 
a meta-analysis found that the dACC, but not the pgACC or sgACC, is consistently recruited 
during type-two emotion regulation functional neuroimaging studies (Kalisch, 2009). Consistent 
with this view, the pgACC and sgACC (along with the mPFC) may mediate the dorsomedial and 
lPFC central to reappraisal. They may serve a similar function with the amygdala, as the 
amygdala has little to no connectivity with the lPFC (Amaral et al., 1992; Kalisch, 2009). 
Finally, type-one emotion regulation, which can be examined through distraction and emotion 
labeling tasks, activates the pgACC, sgACC, and mPFC (Delgado et al., 2008; Lieberman et al., 
2007); hypothesized to reflect the structures’ generic inhibition of negative emotional processing 
(i.e., GNC-1 or type-one emotion regulation) to the amygdala and can be recruited by higher-
order regions of the GNC-2 (e.g., dACC or lPFC). 
In a review of the literature, Kalisch and Gerlicher (2014) suggested similar division of 
the dACC but into rostral and posterior portions. The rdACC – not the pdACC, is associated with 





more specifically, may be related to type-two emotion (i.e., GNC-2) and type-two emotion 
regulation. Further evidence comes from functional connectivity studies, which indicate that the 
rdACC has reciprocal connections with the pdACC (i.e., physiological processing), the 
periaqueductal gray, the amygdala, and aIN (Chiba et al., 2001; Gashghaei et al., 2007; Grupe & 
Nitschke, 2013). Finally, with increased connectivity between the rdACC-amygdala positively 
correlates with individuals’ trait anxiety, indicating that threat appraisal processes in the rdACC 
activates portions of the amygdala, alerting one to potentially threating stimuli (Etkin et al., 
2011). Collectively, the literature supports the distinction between dACC and the ventral ACC 
(i.e., pgACC and sgACC), where the latter is an important component is central for type-two 
emotion regulation (and GNC-2), but the former facilitates processes primarily related to type-
one (and GNC-1) emotion regulation. 
 
1.7.4. Medial-Lateral Orbitofrontal Cortex (mOFC; lOFC) 
It is unsurprising that the OFC has been implicated as being a part of the GNC (LeDoux 
& Pine, 2016), as it often associated with the integration of information vital for consciousness 
(see LeDoux & Brown, 2017). The OFC is often divided into mOFC and lOFC portions that 
have been shown to have differential functions and connectivity. Broadly, the OFC is involved in 
emotion, reward valuation, and reward-related decision making, where it projects its 
representations to the dACC for action-outcome learning (Rolls, 2015). The OFC has direct 
connections to the amygdala, and receives input from each sensory modality (e.g., visual, 
olfactory), providing “what” information (Rolls, 2015).  
The mOFC has consistently been associated with taste, oral texture, olfaction stimuli, and 





Rolls, 2004; Rolls 2015; Rolls, Kringelbach, & De Araujo, 2003; Rolls, O’Doherty, Kringelbach, 
Francis, Bowtell, & McGlone, 2003). A meta-analysis (Kringelbach & Rolls, 2004) found that 
the mOFC is related to contextual evaluation of stimuli and updating the meaning of emotional 
stimuli as they change over time, which is essential to altering stimulus meaning during 
reappraisal. As well, during gambling tasks, the monetary reward value is presented in the 
mOFC, but the monetary outcome loss is presented in the lOFC (O’Doherty, Kringelbach, Rolls, 
Hornak, & Andrews, 2001). However, the OFC has been conceptualized as a convergence zone 
for afferents from limbic and association areas; therefore, evidence for the OFC contribution of 
the GNC-1/GNC-2 and relating to both type-one and type-two emotion regulation will be 
provided as well.  
The lOFC activity is consistently related to the evaluation of punishers and future value 
of stimuli, which can lead to a change in ongoing behavior (De Araujo et al., 2003; Rolls, 2015). 
Activation of lOFC is noted when stimulus-reward mappings are changed (O'Doherty et al., 
2003). This is consistent with neuroimaging studies showing activation of lOFC and related areas 
of vlPFC when participants are performing the Stroop task (Bench et al., 1993), providing 
responses opposite of what is cued (Paus et al., 1993), inhibiting an attentional shift (Nobre et al., 
1999), inhibiting motor movement (Krams et al., 1998), changing entrenched responses (Taylor, 
Kornblum, Minoshima, Oliver, & Koeppe, 1994), and deductive and inductive reasoning (Goel 
et al., 1997).  
The OFC, broadly, is associated with cognitive reappraisal (Banks et al., 2007; Goldin et 
al., 2008; Ochsner et a., 2004; Etkin et al., 2011). Specifically, the connectivity between the 
amygdala, OFC, and dmPFC seem to be essential to type-two emotion regulation, where the 





individual’s self-reported negative affect following cognitive reappraisal (Banks et al., 2007). 
This has led some to speculate that the OFC may serve as a mediator between the lower-order 
DFN (e.g., amygdala) and the higher-order cortical structures (e.g., PFC).  
In line with this notion, it has been posited that the OFC with the vmPFC are implicated 
in the integration of bodily signals that help decision making, termed the somatic marker 
hypothesis (see Dunn, Dalgleish, & Lawrence, 2006 for a critical review). For instance, the OFC 
receives information from a number of regions in the sensory cortex (e.g., Rolls, 2015). 
Moreover, the OFC has inputs from somatosensory cortex, inferior temporal cortex, temporal 
pole, and the visual association areas (Barbas, 1995; Morecraft, Geula, & Mesulam, 1992; 
Petrides & Pandya, 1988). The amygdala has direct projections that reach the OFC (Krettek & 
Price, 1977; Ray & Price, 1993). The OFC then provides input to the ACC, hypothalamus, 
ventral tegmental area and caudate nucleus inferior temporal and entorhinal cortices (Nauta, 
1964; Kemp & Powell, 1970; Insausti, Amaral, & Cowan, 1987). The diverse pattern of 
connectivity suggests that the OFC may serve as a convergence region for afferents from both 
emotion and sensory regions. A wide-range of connectivity is also consistent with either a wide 
range of functions or an integrative role; therefore, it is likely to be important for both type-one 
(i.e., GNC-1) and type-two (i.e., GNC-2) emotion regulation. 
 
1.7.5. Dorsomedial and Ventral Medial Prefrontal Cortex (dmPFC; vmPFC) 
 The mPFC is typically parsed into the dmPFC and vmPFC, which have been found to 
have differential functions. For instance, meta-analytic studies show reappraisal of negative 
stimuli typically recruit the lateral and dorsomedial PFC (e.g., Banks et al., 2007). Further, the 





and reduced activity in the DFN (e.g., amygdala) is frequently considered an index of cognitive 
reappraisal (Banks et al., 2007; Buhle et al., 2014). Broadly, dmPFC is thought to moderate the 
significance of a stimuli (i.e., salience) through the regulation of attention to sensory input 
regions in the amygdala and hippocampus (Kolb, 1984) and by mediating amygdala input to the 
nucleus accumbens, facilitating motivation and learning (Jackson & Moghaddam, 2001). While 
dmPFC activation is consistently found during effortful emotion regulation (i.e., type-two), the 
vmPFC likely serves a more domain-general role, useful for a number of various goal-directed 
behaviors (see Nakamura-Palacios et al., 2016).  
The inverse relationship between cortical-subcortical activity is consistent with a “top-
down” model of emotion regulation that involves the dmPFC, along with domain-general 
cognitive control regions: dlPFC, vlPFC, and pPL (Buhle et al., 2014; Diekhof, Geier, Falkai, & 
Gruber, 2011; Kalisch 2009; Ochsner et al. 2012; Ochsner & Gross 2005, 2008; Schiller & 
Delgado 2010). Again, directly mapping on to structures hypothesized to comprise the GNC-2 
and type-two emotion regulation. Interestingly, electrolytic lesions of the vmPFC (but not the 
dmPFC, vlPFC, nor IN cortex) interfere with type-one emotion regulation, such as freezing 
(Morgan, Romanski, & LeDoux, 1993; Morgan & LeDoux, 1995); evidence that the vmPFC is 
more likely important to type-one (i.e., GNC-1) emotion regulation. 
 The dmPFC is positively correlated with reappraisal (e.g., Buhle et al., 2014), associated 
with rule-based processing, and controls motor activity through its connections with the motor 
cortex, which, in turn, directs the execution of movement (Narayanan & Laubach, 2008). Using 
principal component analysis to examine the neurofunctional organization of regions implicated 
in reappraisal (Klumpp, Bhaumik, Kinney, & Fitzgerald, 2018), the dmPFC was found to have 





depression showed more controlled dmPFC activity following psychotherapy (Messina, Sambin, 
Palmieri, & Viviani, 2013; Messina, Sambin, Beschoner, & Viviani, 2016). Together, it appears 
that the dmPFC relates to emotional perceptual and emotional consciousness through its 
recruitment during rule-based processing and reappraisal (possibly respectively). Support 
converges for the dmPFC serving as a pivotal structure within the type-two emotion regulation 
circuit and GNC-2.  
Broadly, the vmPFC has largely been implicated in decision making (e.g., Koob, 2013), 
fitting well with the necessity of this structure in both perceptual and emotional consciousness 
(see LeDoux & Pine, 2016). However, significant evidence has related the vmPFC to various 
aspects of emotion and emotion regulation, as activation is associated with behavioral rigidity 
(Killcross & Coutureau, 2003). Interestingly, broad mPFC lesions often lead to depressive-like 
behaviors, such as learned helplessness (Klein et al., 2010), but inactivation of the vmPFC is 
likened to an antidepressant response (Slattery, Neumann, & Cryan, 2011). The primarily 
efferent projections from the vmPFC are to the nucleus accumbens shell, but the dmPFC mainly 
projects to the nucleus accumbens core (Voorn, Vanderschuren, Groenewegen, Robbins, & 
Pennartz, 2004). Notably, experiments have found that the dmPFC- nucleus accumbens core and 
vmPFC- nucleus accumbens shell pathways are essential to a) drug-seeking behavior and b) 
promotion/inhibition of those behaviors (depending on learning history), respectively (Bossert et 
al., 2012; LaLumiere & Kalivas, 2008; McFarland, Lapish, & Kalivas, 2003). By extension, the 
vmPFC has efferent projections (Peters, Kalivas, & Quirk, 2008), with evidence that this circuit 
is essential for the suppression of inappropriate behavior – possibly promoting or sustaining the 
extinction of unreinforced actions. vmPFC promotes actions through its primarily GABAergic 





et al. (2011) provided evidence that fear extinction or acquisition, in large, is mediated by 
whether glutamatergic or GABAergic neurons are activated. The release of 
glutamatergic/GABAergic is triggered by the lateral nucleus of the amygdala, an area with robust 
connections with the nucleus accumbens shell. The vmPFC (limbic and infralimbic subdivisions) 
also receives input from the hippocampus and thalamic nuclei, critical in short- and long-term 
memory, contextual memory, and spatial navigation (Varela, Kumar, Yang, & Wilson, 2014). 
Together with the strong connections between the vmPFC, lateral nucleus of the 
amygdala, and nucleus accumbens (Cardinal et al., 2002), it may be hypothesized that the 
vmPFC serves as a type-one, unconscious working memory hub, integrating information from 
many subcortical and cortical structures, modulating the acquisition, as well as extinction, of 
defensive fear behaviors. Ochsner et al. (2012) provide further support, as the vmPFC is 
described as integrating affective valuations of specific stimulus (e.g., DFN, ventral striatum). 
Specifically receiving input from the MTL, brainstem, and lPFC. Therefore, the vmPFC is 
hypothesized to primarily comprise the GNC-1 and be important for type-one emotion 
regulation, potentially influencing the particular emotion regulation strategy used. If this 
hypothesis is correct, one would suspect that the vmPFC would mediate emotion reappraisal, 
such notion has robust support (Motzkin, Phillippi, Wolf, Baskaya, & Koengs, 2015; Gold et al., 
2015; Oschner et al., 2012). 
 
1.7.6. Ventral Lateral and Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex (vlPFC; dlPFC) 
 Broadly, the lPFC has been most consistently associated with conscious awareness (Del 
Cul et al., 2009; Pascual-Leone & Walsh, 2001; Vuilleumier et al., 2008). It is unsurprising that 





Therefore, both of these structures are thought to reflect type-two (and GNC-2) emotion 
regulation. The vlPFC has been consistently implicated with the selection/inhibition and 
maintenance of goal-relevant information (e.g., reappraisals; Blumfield, Lee, & D’Esposito, 
2014; Buhle et al., 2014), verbal retrieval (Wolf, Vasic, & Walter, 2006), verbal fluency 
(Hanslmayr, Matuschek, & Fellner, 2014), and various other aspects of semantic retrieval (see 
Diamond & Levine, 2017).  
Thus, the vlPFC, along with the dlPFC, have strong reciprocal connections with the 
hippocampus through the retrospenial and parahippocampus cortices (e.g., Goldman-Rakic et al., 
1984). The vlPFC is consistently found to be activated during type-two emotion regulation, 
reappraisal (Wager et al., 2008) Specifically, the vlPFC is critical in top-down modulation of 
activity for the retrieval of specific features of information when familiarity and/or stimulus-
stimulus relations are not sufficient for memory retrieval (Kostopoulos & Petrides, 2016). In 
contrast, evidence suggests that the dlPFC has long been implicated in storing, maintaining, and 
manipulating working memory representations (e.g., Goldman-Rakic, 1995). This would include 
appraisals, suggesting that the dlPFC may be more involved with episodic encoding than the 
vlPFC (Buhle et al., 2014; Diamond & Levine, 2017). The results consistently have indicated 
that patients with affective disorders tend to over recruit the dlPFC, when compared to controls 
(Campbell-Sills et al., 2011; Greening et al., 2013; Johnstone et al., 2007).  
 Four meta-analyses provide overwhelming evidence for the notion that the lPFC is 
critical for perceptual and emotional consciousness, and extendedly, type-two (and GNC-2) 
emotion regulation. Of 23 functional imaging studies of healthy participants engaging in 
cognitive reappraisal, results indicated that significant (bilateral) dlPFC, vlPFC, dACC, pPL, as 





specifically, was found to correspond to activation in the dlPFC, dACC, and 
supplementary/premotor area activation in another meta-analysis of 44 functional imaging 
studies (Frank et al., 2014). Buhle et al. (2014) identified the same regions as Kohn et al. (2014), 
the dlPFC, vlPFC, dACC, supplementary/premotor area activation, and pPL as important in type-
two emotion regulation. A final meta-analysis, which examined emotion regulation among 
clinical populations, consistently found that reduced recruitment of the vlPFC and dlPFC was 
related to impaired down-regulation of negative emotion, across clinical populations (Zilverstand 
et al., 2017). Not only do the four meta-analyses provide support for the role of the lPFC in type-
two emotion regulation, they also provide substantial converging evidence for the first 
overarching hypothesis: regions involved in emotional consciousness are not fundamentally 
different than those that facilitate type-one and type-two emotion regulation.  
Many researchers have suggested that the lPFC may be better organized along its rostral-
caudal axis, where more rostral regions are involved in more complex, abstract, control functions 
(Badre & D’Esposito, 2007; Koechlin, Ody, & Kouneiher, 2003; Koechlin & Summerfield, 
2007; Nee & Brown, 2012). Extendedly, the mid dlPFC has been associated with imposing 
higher-order constraints on more concrete processing in the vlPFC. Other research groups have 
suggested that the lPFC is involved in diverse types of cognitive demands, but lacks regional 
specificity (e.g., Crittenden & Duncan, 2012). Functionally, the vlPFC seems to be more 
generally associated with contextual rules and selection of task-relevant information. In contrast, 
the dlPFC seems to be more strongly related to working memory and resolving interference of 
task-irrelevant information (Muhl-Karbe et al., 2016). Put differently, the vlPFC may contribute 
to cue interpretation and task initiation, but the dlPFC processes task-specific information, 





as a central bottleneck between type-one (unconscious, bottom-up) and type-two (conscious, top-
down) processing. Moreover, rostral regions of the dlPFC appear to be increasingly important for 
type-two, as it aids in the protecting task-goals from interfering stimuli (Muhl-Karbe et al., 
2016). Therefore, it is surmised that the vlPFC and dlPFC appear to be structures central to 
GNC-2 and type-two emotion regulation.  
 
1.8. Amygdala Connectivity and Emotion 
 More evidence of the two-system framework comes from examining the functional 
connectivity between lower- (i.e., GNC-1) and higher-order structures (i.e., GNC-2). Clearly, the 
amygdala does not operate in isolation, but it appears to serve as a junction within multiple 
neural networks (Pessoa, 2008). During resting state fMRI, the amygdala is functionally 
correlated with cortical brain regions such as the inferior frontal gyrus and superior frontal gyrus 
(Roy, et al. 2009). These results were corroborated by a recent meta-analysis of amygdala 
functional connectivity using meta-analytic connectivity modeling (Robinson, Laird, Glahn, 
Lovallo, & Fox, 2010).  
Overall, amygdala-PFC connectivity has been found to play a critical role in emotion 
regulation (Wager et al., 2008), interpretation of emotionally ambiguous facial expressions (Kim, 
Somerville, Johnstone, Alexander, & Whalen, 2003), fear conditioning and extinction (LeDoux 
2000; Morgan et al., 1993; Quirk, Likhtik, Pelletier, & Paré, 2003; Rosenkranz, Moore, & Grace, 
2003), elevated trait anxiety (Kim & Whalen, 2009), and pathological anxiety (Hahn et al., 
2011). Specifically, using resting-state fMRI, Hahn and colleagues (2011) found that individuals 
with social anxiety disorder had reduced functional connectivity between the amygdala and the 





in a healthy sample (Kim, Gee, Loucks, Davis, & Whalen, 2010). As well, state anxiety levels in 
individuals with social anxiety was inversely correlated with the functional connectivity strength 
between the amygdala and the OFC. The latter provides credence for the view that amygdala-
PFC circuitry plays a significant role in pathological, as well as trait, anxiety. 
 Structural connections (i.e., axonal connections) between the amygdala and parts of the 
cortex are also associated with emotional processing and anxiety. More recently, anxiety has 
been linked to a number of white matter tracts. Specifically, the UF has been found to be 
perturbed in individuals with social anxiety disorder, when compared to healthy controls (Phan et 
al., 2009). This finding extends to healthy individuals without a history of psychiatric disorders; 
where there is a negative correlation between UF volume and trait anxiety (Baur, Hänggi, & 
Jäncke, 2012). Moreover, these authors found that the volumes of the left UF and left amygdala 
were inversely associated. Overall, the UF has been posited to allow temporal lobe-based 
mnemonic associations to alter behavior through interactions with the lOFC, where the lateral 
OFC provides information on the valence of a decision (Von Der Heide, Skipper, Klobusicky, & 
Olson, 2013). This view suggests that disruption of the UF may cause problems in the use of 
memory to guide behavior, as well as in the acquisition of certain types of learning and memory 
(e.g., fear learning).  
Additionally, there is growing research on the association between the CG white matter 
tract and anxiety. The CG tract links within the limbic-cortical networks. The tract begins within 
the white matter of the temporal pole, extending to the posterior and superior parietal lobe, down 
to the corpus callosum, into the frontal lobe, ending in the anterior and inferior to the genu of the 
corpus callosum in the OFC (Schmahmann & Pandya, 2007). Therefore, damage to the CG 





the development of mood and anxiety disorders. Diagnostically, deficits in the CG tract have 
been linked to panic disorder (Han et al., 2008; Yu et al., 2013), posttraumatic stress disorder 
(Abe et al., 2006; Kim et al., 2006), and obsessive-compulsive disorder (Cannistraro et al., 2007; 
Chiu et al., 2011). Cognitively, CG integrity is associated with verbal memory (Delano-Wood et 
al., 2012), visual memory (Kantarci et al., 2011), executive functioning (e.g., inhibition; Metzler-
Baddeley et al., 2012; Schermuly et al., 2010), and impairments that are also found in anxious 
samples (Bremner et al., 2004; Gilbertson et al., 2001; Vasterling et al., 1998; Vasterling et al., 
2002; Yehuda et al., 1995). Relatedly, there is some evidence that CG tract integrity is likely to 
have a role in the development of anxiety symptoms, possibly via effects on fear-extinction 
processes (Fani et al., 2014). 
 
1.9. Empirical Support 
 
1.9.1. Testing the Two-System Framework 
 Given the two-system framework of emotion regulation, it is unsurprising that the 
literature on the relationship between amygdala volume and anxiety has been inconsistent (see 
De Bellis et al., 2000; Milham et al., 2005). This is partially attributed to the fact that amygdala 
volume is hypothesized to be a proxy for the GNC-1. Without the complementary second system 
(i.e., cortical GNC-2), only half a picture is painted. Importantly, amygdala volume during 
development has been found to significantly correlate with cortical thickness in the regions that 








1.9.2. Current Study 
The current study looks to build on previous literature by determining regions of cortical 
thickness that relate to amygdala volume in a sample of typically functioning youth (Albaugh et 
al., 2013), with the goal of delineating cortical regions implicated in emotion regulation (i.e., 
GNC-2), demonstrate this relationship is moderated by their structural connectivity, and link 
grey-matter thickness (i.e., regions that correlated amygdala volume) and subcortical (i.e., 
amygdala volume) and anxiety symptoms in youth. To this end, utilizing a publicly available 
database, the relationship between cortical thickness and right and left amygdala volume was 
examined utilizing general linear models. Next, diffusor tensor imaging was used to determine if 
white matter structural connectivity moderated the relationship between amygdala volume and 
correlated individual cortical thickness. Given the discrepant literature on the relationship 
between amygdala volume and anxiety, I suspected that PFC cortical thickness clusters may 
control for individual differences in emotion regulation. Therefore, in an exploratory nature, I 
then examined whether regions of cortical thickness (determined from the first analyses) 
indirectly effect the relationship between youths’ amygdala volume and self-reported anxiety.  
Given previous research on the effects of age on the correlation between cortical 
thickness and anxiety (Ducharme et al., 2014; Gee et al., 2013; Newman et al., 2016) and the 
well-established sex differences in anxiety prevalence (Cartwright-Hatton et al., 2006; 
Merikangas et al., 2010), the analyses will be controlled for the effects of age and sex. 
Furthermore, youth younger than 10 years of age will be excluded from analyses, given the 
literature on the positive to negative shift in connectivity between the amygdala and PFC that 







Hypothesis 1: amygdala volume in youth will be negatively correlated with regions 
involved in the top-down regulation of amygdala activity, such as the lPFC, lOFC, mOFC, aIN, 
rACC, and pPL.  
Hypothesis 2: volumetric and fractional anisotropy differences in the UF and CG will 
moderate the relationship between the amygdala and correlated PFC regions.  
Hypothesis 3: gray-matter thickness and amygdala volume will significantly relate to 
anxiety symptoms. 
Exploratory Hypothesis: the relationship between amygdala volume and anxiety will be 








The present study included a total of 34 typically developing youth (10-17 years; Mage = 
13.9, SD = 2.21; 17 females, 17 males; see Table 4.1) from the Nathan Kline Institute Rockland 
Sample, which is provided by the Nathan Kline Institute (NY, USA) and publicly available at the 
International Neuroimaging Data-sharing Initiative online database. The Nathan Kline Institute 
institutional review board approved all procedures for collection and sharing of data. All subjects 
were administered the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence, a Full-Scale Intelligence 
Quotient over 80 (see Table 4.1). At the time of data acquisition from the Nathan Kline Institute 
Rockland Sample database, T1-weighted MRI scans were available for 46 children and 
adolescents. Four youth were excluded from the analyses because their MRI scan did not survive 
quality control inspection. Seven participants were excluded because of missing data (i.e., 
missing anxiety scores). One participant was excluded because they were younger than 10 years-
old. Written informed consent and child assent was obtained from each participant. Further 
details regarding the image acquisition protocol is available on their website 
(http://fcon_1000.projects.nitrc.org/indi/pro/nki.html; Nooner et al., 2012). 
 
2.2. Imaging Protocol 
The following description of the imaging protocol is taken from Nathan Kline Institute 
source (http://fcon_1000.projects.nitrc.org/indi/enhanced/mri_protocol.html): “All subjects were 
scanned using a Siemens TrioTM 3.0 T MRI scanner. The 3D T1-weighted images were 
acquired using a magnetization-prepared rapid gradient echo sequence (repetition time/echo time 





size = 1.0 ×1.0 × 1.0 mm3, number of slices = 192) and were used for spatial normalization and 
group-specific template generation. More details of the MRI protocol are available online 
(http://fcon_1000.projects.nitrc.org/indi/enhanced/ mri_protocol.html). Further phenotypic 
information may be accessed via the Nathan Kline Institute website (see 
http://fcon_1000.projects. nitrc.org/indi/enhanced).” In a subset of Nathan Kline Institute 
Rockland Sample, test-retest (< 1 month apart) and longitudinal scans (1.22 ± 0.29 years apart) 
demonstrated high reliability for the prediction models obtained and the ability to detect subtle 
differences in the longitudinal scan interval among participants (Zhao, Klein, Castellanos, & 
Milham, 2019). 
 Recently developed multiband echo planar Imaging (Moeller et al., 2010) and 
multiplexed echo planar imaging (Feinberg et al., 2010) approaches enable the acquisition of 
functional MRI and diffusion imaging data with unprecedented sampling rates for full-brain 
coverage through the acquisition of multiple slices simultaneously in the same time it takes to 
obtain a single slice image using standard echo planar imaging (see Smith et al., 2012) for initial 
application of multiband echo planar imaging with recent improvements (Xu et al., 2012). The 
Center for Magnetic Resonance Research has provided the Nathan Kline Institute effort with the 
latest version of the multiband echo planar imaging sequence (Xu et al., 2012) and associated 
image reconstruction algorithms, enabling the acquisition of state-of-the-art imaging datasets for 
this large-scale imaging effort. Specific parameter selections were based on initial pilot data to 
optimize image quality on the scanner. 
The diffusion tensor imaging data were acquired using a 64-direction diffusion tensor 
imaging sequence implemented using generalized autocalibrating partial parallel acquisition, 





time=10ms, echo time=91ms; field of view=256 mm; b-value=1000 s/mm2; in-plane resolution = 
2x2 mm2; slice thickness=2 mm; no inter-slice gap). The acquisition time for this protocol was 
13.5 minutes. 
 
2.3. Cortical Reconstruction and Calculation of Thickness 
 Cortical thickness was estimated from the structural magnetic resonance images using 
FreeSurfer software (http://surfer. nmr.mgh.harvard.edu, Dale et al. 1999), a set of automated 
tools for the reconstruction of brain cortical surface (Fischl & Dale 2000). First, I used the T1-
weighted images to segment cerebral white matter and to estimate the grey-white matter 
interface. Then topographical defects in the grey-white estimate were fixed. This grey-white 
matter estimate was used as the starting point of a deformable surface algorithm searching for the 
pial surface. The whole cortex of each individual subject was visually inspected for inaccuracies 
in segmentation and manually corrected if necessary. Local cortical thickness was measured 
based on the difference between the position of equivalent vertices in the pial and grey-white 
matter surfaces. The surface of the grey-white matter border was inflated and differences 
between subjects in the depth of gyri and sulci were normalized. Each subject’s reconstructed 
brain was morphed and registered to an average spherical surface. In order to obtain cortical 
thickness difference maps the data were smoothed on the surface using a Gaussian smoothing 
kernel with a full-width half maximum of 10 mm. Statistical thickness difference maps were 
constructed using t-statistics. I used a regression approach to focus on the relationship between 
amygdala volume and cortical thickness, controlling for age and sex, using general linear 
modeling (www.surfer.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu). Only regions that survived a Monte Carlo 





2.4. Tract-of-Interest Analyses 
Diffusion-weighted data were processed for each participant using FreeSurfer’s 
TRACULA (Yendiki 2011), which makes use of FSL’s FMRIB's Diffusion Toolbox software for 
some of the preprocessing of the diffusion-weighted image. TRACULA is an automated method 
for reconstructing probabilistic distributions of major white-matter tracts for individual diffusion-
weighted image data based on anatomical priors. It relies on an atlas of manually labeled major 
white matter tracts and anatomical segmentations from an independent sample of participants’ 
data. TRACULA is able to construct 18 different major fiber tracts by using these anatomical 
priors in a probabilistic framework to perform tractography in novel individuals. I selected two a 
priori tracts-of-interest: The UF and CG. 
TRACULA performs three processing steps. First, data is preprocessed with ball-and-
stick model fitting to the diffusion-weighted image data, and tract reconstruction (Behrens et al., 
2007). Preprocessing of the diffusion-weighted images included eddy current and motion 
correction using FMRIB's Diffusion Toolbox, intra-subject registration of diffusion-weighted 
images to T1 using FreeSurfer’s bbregister, inter-subject registration of individual T1 images to 
the MNI template, the generation of white-matter and cortex masks from the FreeSurfer outputs 
and whole-brain masks from the diffusion-weighted and T1 images, tensor fitting using FMRIB's 
Diffusion Toolbox’s DTIFIT, and the generation of anatomical priors for the white-matter tracts 
from the training data and the individual subject data. After preprocessing ball-and-stick model 
fitting was performed using FMRIB's Diffusion Toolbox’s BEDPOSTX, which establishes a 
distribution of diffusion parameters at each voxel to allow for probabilistic tractography. Finally, 
tract reconstruction is performed by combining the anatomical priors with individual diffusion 





space. After reconstruction, mean functional anisotropy (i.e., a measure of white-matter integrity 
derived from the ration of radial and axial diffusivity) was extracted from each tract. All 
participants demonstrated successful tracking of both tracts-of-interest.  
The UF and CG were selected a priori as they connect the limbic system to various 
aspects of the PFC cortex. Both regions also have an established relationship with anxious 
symptoms. I sought to determine if their functional anisotropy (i.e., a measure sensitive to 
several tissue characteristics such as myelination, axon diameter, fiber density, fiber 
organization) and/or their volume moderates the relationship between the amygdala volume and 
cortical thickness, which I would predict if the any grey-matter relationship between amygdala 
and frontoparietal regions were due to connectivity. Only ipsilateral analyses were examined 
(i.e., right amygdala to right cortical thickness; left amygdala to left cortical thickness), using the 
right UF/CG FA/volume and left UF/CG FA/volume, respectively.  
 
2.5. Measures 
The MASC (March, 1998) is a 45-item self-report questionnaire for symptoms of anxiety in 
youth. Total scores range from 0 to 120, with high scores indicating greater childhood anxiety. 
The four empirically derived factor index scores are Social Anxiety, Separation Anxiety, Harm 
Avoidance, and Physical Symptoms. The MASC has shown good internal consistency ratings 
from .70 to .83 and Cronbach’s alpha ranging from .74 to .85 (March, 1998). Further, the MASC 
has demonstrated good convergent validity (Baldwin & Dadds, 2007), good concurrent validity 
(Rynn et al., 2006), adequate divergent validity, and good test-retest reliability (March, Parker, 
Sullivan, Stallings, & Conners, 1997). The total t-score of the MASC was used, which 





3. Analytic Plan 
3.1. Statistical Analyses 
My first hypothesis was tested vertex wise across the brain surface by fitting GLMs of the effect 
of amygdala volume (corrected for total intracranial volume) on thickness in every vertex across 
the surface. Thus, I performed separate analyses for right and left amygdala to determine their 
independent relationships with cortical thickness across youth. Multiple linear regressions 
included the main effects and interactions between individual mean tract volume/tract functional 
anisotropy (respectively) and amygdala volume in an effort to predict cortical thickness clusters. 
Finally, Pearson’s correlations were used to determine if cortical and subcortical grey-matter 
volumes would significantly correlate with self-reported anxiety. 
As previously mentioned, because age is negatively associated with cortical thickness 
(Gee et al., 2013; Fjell et al., 2009; Salat et al., 2004; Westlye et al., 2009) and girls tend to have 
elevated levels of anxiety compared to boys (Kessler et al., 2012), I included age and sex as 
covariates in all statistical models. To reduce the probability of Type I errors, all cortical 
thickness analyses were corrected for multiple comparisons using cluster size inference by means 
of Z MCS as implemented in FreeSurfer (Hayasaka & Nichols, 2003; Hagler et al., 2006). All 
clusters were tested against an empirical null distribution of maximum cluster size built using 
synthesized Z-distributed data across 10,000 permutations. These analyses yielded clusters fully 
corrected for multiple comparisons across the surface. The initial cluster-forming threshold 
employed will be p < 0.05. Surface-based t-statistics for each corrected cluster, representing raw 
effect-sizes across the brain, will also be presented (p < 0.05). I also present surface-based t-





In sum, I first determined the independent associations between right/left amygdala 
volume (corrected for total intracranial volume) and cortical thickness in youth (respectively). 
Following, I completed an interaction analysis to determine whether white matter structural 
connectivity moderates the relationship between the amygdala volume and correlated cortical 
regions. Next, the relationship between cortical/subcortical grey matter and anxiety symptoms 
was explored. Finally, I explored whether PFC cortical thickness clusters have an indirect effect 







Youths’ demographic, psychometric, and neurocognitive data are reported in Table 4.1. All 
subjects had a Full-Scale Intelligence Quotient over 80 (see mean and minimum/maximum 
values in Table 4.1 using the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence, second edition). At the 
time of data acquisition from the Nathan Kline Institute Rockland Sample database, T1-weighted 
MRI scans were available for 46 children and adolescents. Four youth were excluded from the 
analysis because their MRI scan did not survive quality control inspection. Seven participants 
were excluded because of missing MASC scores. One participant was excluded because they 
were younger than 10 years-old. Thus, the final sample, on which the analyses were performed, 
included 34 youth. 
 












Demographics (n = 34) N (%) or mean ±SD (range) 
Males 17 (50.0%) 
Age (years) 13.91±2.21 (10-17) 
Right Handedness 30 (88.2%) 
Race  
   White  24 (70.6%) 
   Black 6 (17.6%) 
   Asian 4 (11.8%) 
Ethnicity-Non-Hispanic/Spanish 24 (70.6%) 
 Psychometric Scales (n = 34)  
MASC-Total T-Score 46.19±9.15 (26-68) 





4.2. Amygdala Volume and Cortical Thickness: Ipsilateral Analyses  
Figure 4.1 shows MCS corrected maps from a GLM testing the relationship between amygdala 
volume and ipsilateral cortical thickness in a cluster-wise manner, corrected to p < .05. Full 
results can be found in Table 4.2, which shows significant zMCS corrected clusters resulting 
from a significant relationship between amygdala volume and ipsilateral cortical thickness with 
age and sex as covariates. All clusters showed a negative effect, consistent with previous 
literature (e.g., Ducharme et al., 2014). 
 
Table 4.2. Ipsilateral relationships between cortical thickness and right/left amygdala. Note. Z-




4.2.1. Right Amygdala Volume and Right Hemisphere Cortical Thickness 
Most notably, in the right hemisphere, significant clusters were observed in the RMF extending 
down to the vlPFC and parts of the lOFC (p < .0001). In addition, a significant cluster was 




Variable/Location L/R X Y Z Cluster Size Z-value p 
Right Amygdala 
Negative Effects 
   RMF; vlPFC R 27.6 56.1 -11.0 4896.21 -4.725 <.0001 
   SPL R 10.3 -49.5 69.4 2119.75 -4.501 <.0001 
   SFG; dPFC R 21.5 6.2 57.5 1315.67 -3.093 <.0001 
   Cuneus R 19.4 -66.2 13.8 3733.19 -2.658 <.01 
Left Amygdala 
Negative Effects 






Figure 4.1. Ipsilateral relationships between cortical thickness and right/left amygdala. The light 
blue-dark blue scale represents the effect-size in Freesurfer’s -log10(p) format. 
 
4.2.2. Left Amygdala Volume and Left Hemisphere Cortical Thickness  
The relationship between left amygdala volume and cortical thickness in the left hemisphere 
indicated one larger, robust cluster in the LOFC extending into the vlPFC and back into the 
rACC (z = 6.475; p < .00001). 
 
4.3. Amygdala Volume and Cortical Thickness: Contralateral Analyses  
Figure 4.2 shows MCS corrected maps from a GLM testing the relationship between amygdala 
volume and contralateral cortical thickness in a cluster-wise manner, correct to p < .05. Full 




















Table 4.3. Contralateral relationships between cortical thickness and right/left amygdala. Note. 




4.3.1. Right Amygdala Volume and Left Hemisphere Cortical Thickness  
There were seven significant clusters observed. Most notably, there was a large cluster detected 
in the RMF extending down to the vlPFC, parts of the lOFC, and over to the superior and MTG 
(p < .0001). Additionally, a significant cluster was observed in the SFG and dmPFC (p < .0001) 












Variable/Location L/R X Y Z Cluster Size Z-value p 
Right Amygdala 
Negative Effects 
   RMF; vlPFC; dlPFC L -36.9 28.7 32.7 8121.95 -4.062 <.0001 
   PCL L -15.6 -42.3 65.1 2865.01 -3.969 <.0001 
   FG L -28.9 -46.6 -18.6 4014.20 -3.934 <.0001 
   SFG; dmPFC L -7.0 26.2 45.9 1890.96 -3.259 <.001 
   PCS /Post-CG L -20.3 -70.9 19.2 3479.10 -2.977 <.01 
   Pre-CG L -57.1 -3.6 15.2 1307.37 -2.265 <.01 
   MTG L -62.1 -41.8 -6.2 1181.93 -2.245 <.01 
Left Amygdala 
Negative Effects 
   RMF; vlPFC R 28.5 54.9 -10.9 4027.26 -4.795 <.0001 
   SPL 1 R 11.0 -51.5 67.5 1624.84 -3.427 <.001 






Figure 4.2. Contralateral relationships between cortical thickness and right/left amygdala. The 
light blue-dark blue scale represents the effect-size in Freesurfer’s -log10(p) format. 
 
4.3.2. Left Amygdala Volume and Right Hemisphere Cortical Thickness 
The relationship between left amygdala volume and cortical thickness in the right hemisphere 
had three significant clusters. The largest and most robust cluster was located in the RMF 
extending down to the vlPFC and over into the vmPFC (p < .0001). An additional two clusters 
were observed in the SPL (p < .01). 
 
4.4. Interaction Between Amygdala and Functional Connectivity 
Multiple regressions were used to test the hypotheses that the ipsilateral relationships between 
amygdala volume and cortical thickness were moderated by UF and/or CG volume and fractional 
anisotropy with age and sex as covariates. Figure 4.3 demonstrate the significant interaction 
























4.4.1. Right Amygdala Volume by Right UF Volume Predicting Ipsilateral Cortical 
Thickness 
 
Results indicated that the volume of the right UF tract significantly moderated the relationship 
between right amygdala volume and cortical thickness in the right SPL. In the model with right 
amygdala volume and right UF volume as predictors of right SPL cortical thickness, only right 
amygdala volume (β = -.630, t(31) = -4.493, p > .001) significantly predicted right SPL cortical 
thickness, F(3, 29) = 9.228, p < .001; Adjusted R2 = .488. The addition of the interaction of right 
amygdala volume and right UF volume was statistically significant (β = -.303, t(31) = -1.987, p = 
.05). 
Right UF volume significantly moderated the relationship between right amygdala 
volume and cortical thickness in the right cuneus. In the model with right amygdala volume and 
right UF volume as predictors of right cuneus thickness, right amygdala volume (β = -.498, t(31) 
= -3.66, p = .001) and right UF volume (β = -.371, t(31) = -2.481, p < .05) significantly predicted 
cuneus thickness, F(3, 29) = 10.463, p < .00001; Adjusted R2 = .469. The addition of the 
interaction of right amygdala volume and right UF volume was also statistically significant (β = -
.542, t(31) = -3.662, p = .001). 
The relationship between right amygdala volume and cortical thickness in the right 
RMF/vlPFC was only trending towards significance (β = -.266, t(31) = -1.743, p = .092), with 
only right amygdala volume (β = -.676, t(31) = -4.669, p < .001) and right UF volume (β = -.314, 
t(31) = -2.013, p = .05) significantly predicting right RMF/vlPFC cortical thickness, F(3, 29) = 
9.239, p < .001; Adjusted R2 = .436. 
In the model with right amygdala volume and right UF volume predicting right 
SFG/dPFC cortical thickness, only right amygdala volume was significant (β = -.531, t(31) = -





4.4.2. Right Amygdala Volume by Right CG Volume Predicting Ipsilateral Cortical 
Thickness 
 
The volume of the right CG significantly moderated the relationship between right amygdala 
volume and right RMF/vlPFC cortical thickness. In the model with right amygdala volume and 
right CG volume as predictors of right RMF/vlPFC thickness, right amygdala volume (β = -.807, 
t(31) = -6.752, p < .00001) and right CG volume (β = -.463, t(31) = -3.829, p < .001) 
significantly predicted right RMF/vlPFC thickness, F(3, 29) = 16.895, p < .00001; Adjusted R2 = 
.598. The addition of the interaction of right amygdala volume and right CG volume was 
statistically significant (β = -.322, t(31) = -2.798, p < .01). 
The remaining models testing the hypotheses that the relationship between right 
amygdala volume and the remaining three right hemisphere cortical thickness clusters (i.e., SPL, 
SFG/dPFC, and cuneus) would be moderated by CG volume were not significant.  
 
4.4.3. Left Amygdala Volume by Left UF Volume Predicting Ipsilateral Cortical Thickness 
The left UF volume significantly moderates the relationship between left amygdala volume and 
left lOFC/vlPFC cortical thickness. In the model with left amygdala volume and left UF volume 
as predictors of left lOFC/vlPFC cortical thickness, only left amygdala volume (β = -.692, t(31) 
= -5.344, p < .0001) significantly predicted left lOFC/vlPFC thickness, F(3, 29) = 11.361, p < 
.00001; Adjusted R2 = .493. The addition of the interaction of left amygdala volume and left UF 
volume was statistically significant (β = -.343, t(31) = -2.444, p < .05). 
 
4.4.4. Left Amygdala Volume by Left CG Volume Predicting Ipsilateral Cortical Thickness 
The volume of the left CG tract significantly moderated the relationship between left amygdala 





CG volume as predictors of left lOFC/vlPFC cortical thickness, only left amygdala volume (β = -
.739, t(31) = -5.564, p < .0001) significantly predicted left lOFC/vlPFC thickness, F(3, 29) = 
10.856, p < .00001; Adjusted R2 = .480. The addition of the interaction of left amygdala volume 
and left CG volume was statistically significant (β = -.299, t(31) = -2.256, p < .05). 
 




Figure 4.3. (A) Volume of the left uncinate fasciculus moderates the relationship between left 
amygdala volume and left OFC/rACC cortical thickness. (B) Volume of the left CG moderates 
the relationship between left amygdala volume and left lOFC/vlPFC/rACC) cortical thickness. 
(C) Volume of the right CG moderates the relationship between right amygdala volume and right 
RMF/vlPFC cortical thickness.  
 
4.5. Correlations Among Amygdala, Cortical Thickness, and Anxiety Symptoms 
Full results of the correlations among brain volume (i.e., right/left amygdala volume), significant 
ipsilateral cortical thickness clusters (i.e., right RMF/vlPFC, right SPL, right SFG/dPFC, right 





































































































































 Right and left amygdala volume did not significantly correlate with self-reported anxiety. 
As shown in Figure 4.4, cortical thickness in the right SPL (r = .344, p < .05). Similarly, right 
RMF/vlPFC cortical thickness significantly correlated with youth’s anxiety symptoms (r = .489, 
p < .01), as did cortical thickness in the left lOFC/vlPFC (r = .494, p < .01). Cortical thickness in 
the right SFG/dPFC (r = .314, p < .10) and right cuneus (r = .30, p < .10) trended towards 
significance. 
 
   A.              B.    C. 
 
Figure 4.4. (A) The relationship between right SPL cortical thickness and anxiety symptoms (B) 
The relationship between right RMF/vlPFC cortical thickness and anxiety symptoms. (C) The 
relationship between left lOFC/vlPFC/rACC cortical thickness and anxiety symptoms. 
 
4.6. Correlations Among UF Volume, CG Volume, and Anxiety Symptoms 
Table 4.4 shows the full results of the correlations among UF volume, CG volume, and anxiety 
symptoms (i.e., MASC total T-Score). CG volume significantly correlated with anxiety 
symptoms (r = -.41, p < .05). In addition, UF volume demonstrated a trend toward significance (r 










Table 4.4. Pearson’s correlations among right/left amygdala, ipsilateral cortical thickness, and 
anxiety symptoms (top); Pearson’s correlations among right/left UF, right/left CG, and anxiety 
symptoms (bottom). Note: * = p < .05; † = p < .10. 
 
Subcortical and Cortical Volumes Anxiety symptoms 
Right Amygdala -.23 
Left Amygdala -.14 
OFC / vlPFC / rACC     .49* 
RMF / vlPFC     .44* 
SPL     .34* 
SF / dPFC    .31† 
Cuneus    .30† 
Tracts-of-Interest  
Right Hemisphere  
   UF Volume -.09 
   UF Functional Anisotropy -.27 
   CG Volume   -.41* 
   CG Functional Anisotropy -.22 
Left Hemisphere  
   UF Functional Anisotropy  -.29† 
   UF Volume  -.29† 
   CG Volume -.19 
   CG Functional Anisotropy -.28 
 
4.7. Tests of Indirect Effects: Two-System Framework of Emotion Regulation  
Despite finding no relationship between amygdala volume and anxiety symptoms, given 
previous literature, I conducted a test of indirect effects given the finding that clusters in the PFC 
associated with amygdala volume have a robust relationship with anxiety symptoms. 
Specifically, a suppression effect was suspected during the post-hoc examination of the 
Pearson’s correlations between right/left amygdala volume and anxious symptomatology (r = -
14, p > .05; r = -23, p > .05), as well as the strong positive relationship between the right 
RMF/vlPFC and left OFC/vlPFC/rACC and anxious symptomatology (respectively) (r = 49, p < 





As noted in the introduction, the literature is equivocal on the association between 
amygdala volume and anxious symptomatology (e.g., De Bellis et al., 2000; Milham et al., 
2005), with more recent research on cortical regions involved while youth regulate their 
emotional responses (Wager, Davidson, Hughes, & Lindquist, 2008; Buhle et al. 2014; Silvers et 
al., 2015; Silvers et al., 2016). Therefore, it was hypothesized that the relationship between right 
amygdala volume and self-reported anxiety would be indirectly affected by right RMF/vlPFC, 
whereas the OFC/vlPFC/rACC will have an indirect effect on the relationship between left 
amygdala volume and self-reported anxiety. 
Put differently, I first explored whether the relationship between right/left amygdala 
volume and self-reported anxiety would strengthen once the restricted variance of associated 
cortical thickness regions is considered. First, right amygdala volume’s relationship with anxiety 
symptoms was examined controlling for individual variance in the right RMF/vlPFC. In the left 
hemisphere, the left OFC/vlPFC/rACC was examined as potentially restricting the variance of 
the model, allowing for a more robust relationship between left amygdala volume and self-
reported anxiety to emerge.  
 The test of indirect effects was run using the Preacher and Hayes model (2004). These 
clusters, which were previously identified via GLM analyses, (see Figure 4.1), were evaluated 
for total effect of amygdala volume on anxiety symptoms, which was divided into direct and 
indirect effects that vary as a function of the explanation of variance provided by the presence of 
the respective cortical thickness PFC clusters. A bootstrapping method with 10,000 iterations 
was used to test the 95% confidence intervals of the indirect effect (Palaniyappan, Simmonite, 





include right amygdala volume controlled for intracranial volume, MASC total T-Score, and 
mean PFC cluster thickness generated from the previously ran GLMs. 
 
4.7.1. The Indirect Effect of Cortical Thickness in the Right Hemisphere 
Results of this analysis indicated a reduction in gray matter volume in the vlPFC indirectly 
affected the relationship between right amygdala volume and differences in anxiety symptoms. 
The test of indirect effect model for vlPFC cortical thickness (R2 = 0.53; F[4, 29] = 11.39, p < 
.00001; total effect coefficient = 0.0262) had significant fit. However, right amygdala volume 
had a non-significant direct effect on anxiety symptoms (t(33) = .85 p > .05) and a nonsignificant 
indirect effect (t(33) = -1.31, p = .19). However, mean gray matter volume in the vlPFC had a 
significant direct effect on anxiety symptoms (t(33) = 2.95, p < .01), 95% confidence limits from 
bootstrap test (11.62 – 64.19) and a significant indirect effect (completely standardized 
coefficient (SD) =  -.42 (.14), p < .05), 95% confidence limits from bootstrap test (-.74  –  -.17). 
 
4.7.2. The Indirect Effect of Cortical Thickness in the Left Hemisphere 
Results of this analysis indicated that left amygdala related differences in anxiety symptoms was 
indirectly affected by reduced gray matter thickness in the vlPFC. The test of indirect effect 
model for vlPFC cortical thickness (R2 = 0.56; F[4, 29] = 12.60, p < . 00001; total effect 
coefficient = 0.027) had significant fit. Left amygdala volume had a significant direct effect on 
anxiety symptoms (t(33) = 2.33, p < .05) and a non-significant indirect effect (t(33) = -.82, p > 
.05). Mean gray matter thickness in the vlPFC had a significant direct effect on anxiety 
symptoms (t(33) = 4.39, p < .01), 95% confidence limits from bootstrap testing (26.80 – 73.56) 





95% confidence limits from bootstrap test  (-.95  –  -.30). There was a large effect, where the 
partial correlations between left amygdala volume and anxiety symptoms (with age and sex as 
covariates) increased (r = -.08, p > .05) when the left vlPFC grey matter volume was added as a 

















Figure 4.5. (A)Left vlPFC cortical thickness has an indirect effect on the relationship between 
left amygdala volume (controlled for intracranial volume) and anxiety symptoms; * = p < .01, ** 
= p < .0001; standardized betas (standard error); anxiety symptoms as measured by the MASC 
T-score; covariates included sex and age. (B) Scatterplot illustrating no relationship between left 
amygdala volume and anxiety symptoms with only sex as a covariate (left; p > .05); Scatter plot 
of the partial correlation between left amygdala volume and anxiety symptoms with left vlPFC 
cortical thickness, sex, and age as covariates (p < .0001). All measures were centered prior to 
analysis (hence negative values). 
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4.8. Follow-up Analyses: Right/Left Amygdala Volume by Right/Left vlPFC Thickness as 
Respective Predictors of Self-Reported Anxiety 
 
Follow-up analyses were conducted on the variables included in the two tests of indirect effect 
analyses in an effort to provide further support for the independence of these two systems. To 
this end, I utilized two linear multiple regressions to examine whether right/left amygdala 
volume is moderated by gray matter volume in the right/left vlPFC. Results are congruent with 
the above findings of the independence of these neural systems.  
 The main effects of right amygdala volume and right vlPFC, along with their interaction, 
were examined as predictors of self-reported anxiety. The overall model, F(5, 26) = 1.58, p > 
.05; R2 = .233,  was not significant. Examining the test of higher order unconditional interactions 
was also not a significant predictor of youths’ self-reported anxiety, F(1, 26) = 1.67, p > .05; ΔR2 
= .049, p > .05.  
 The main effects of left amygdala volume and left vlPFC, along with their interaction, 
were examined as predictors of self-reported anxiety. The overall model, F(5, 26) = 2.28, , p > 
.05; R2 = .305, was not significant. Examining the test of higher order unconditional interactions 
was also not a significant predictor of youths’ self-reported anxiety, F(1, 26) = 2.26, p > .05; ΔR2 






The purpose of this study was three-fold. First, I aimed to 1) determine regions of cortical 
thickness that relate to amygdala volume in a sample of typically functioning youth, with the 
goal of identifying cortical regions implicated in emotion regulation, 2) I looked to establish if 
this relationship was moderated by their structural connectivity, and 3) then link grey-matter 
thickness (i.e., regions that correlated amygdala volume) and subcortical volume (i.e., 
amygdala), and anxiety symptoms. 
I hypothesized that amygdala volume in older youth (i.e., >10 years old) would be 
negatively correlated with regions involved in the top-down regulation of amygdala activity (i.e., 
ventral and dorsal PFC, lOFC, and mOFC, and the parietal lobe; See Gee et al., 2013; Silvers et 
al., 2016). Additionally, I posited that the volumetric and functional anisotropy differences in the 
UF and CG tracts would moderate the relationship between the amygdala and predicted gray-
matter thickness (i.e., regions that correlated amygdala volume). Next, I hypothesized that 
cortical and subcortical grey-matter volume would significantly correlate with anxiety symptoms 
in youth. Finally, in an exploratory nature, I examined whether the relationship between 
amygdala volume and anxiety symptoms would strengthen once the restrictive variance of 
associated cortical regions is considered.  
 
5.1. General Linear Model: Amygdala Volume and Cortical Thickness  
I found support for my first hypothesis that older youths’ amygdala volume would be 
negatively correlated with regions involved in the top-down regulation of amygdala activity; the 
ventral and dorsal PFC, lOFC, mOFC, and pPL were correlated with youths’ amygdala volume 





type-one errors. The negative relationship between amygdala volume and PFC thickness is 
congruent with the functional cross-sectional research done on amygdala-PFC connectivity 
throughout development (e.g., Ducharme et al., 2014; Gee et al., 2013). 
The findings are also in line with structural studies examining the relationship between 
reported anxiety and cortical thickness. Specifically, Ducharme and colleagues (2014) 
demonstrated that cortical thickness in portions of the vmPFC/mOFC are positively correlated 
with anxiety in childhood (i.e., < 9 years), but negatively correlated in adolescents and young 
adults. Similarly, Newman and colleagues (2015) found that anxiety was negatively correlated 
with vmPFC cortical thickness, but the relationship diminished with age. Furthermore, this 
positive-negative connectivity switch has also been found functionally by Gee et al. (2013) as 
well. Specifically, there is evidence that there is a developmental reversal of function in 
amygdala-PFC connectivity where positive amygdala-PFC connectivity, found in early 
childhood, becomes negative during the transition to adolescence. Although I did not have a 
sample of young children large enough to demonstrate positive relationships earlier in 
development (cross-sectionally), the negative relationships among the amygdala and regions 
involved in the top-down regulation in older youth is congruent with past literature (e.g., 
Ducharme et al., 2014; Newman et al., 2015).  
The PFC clusters found to be associated with amygdala volume overlap with the 
functional literature on emotion regulation as well. For instance, functional literature has 
consistently found that activity in the PFC, along with the pPL, are associated with emotion 
regulation (e.g., Ochsner & Gross, 2005). More specifically, the vmPFC, vlPFC, dlPFC, and 
dmPFC cortices have been found to be associated with cognitive control of negative emotion 





emotion regulation network includes the ventral PFC, dorsal PFC, lOFC, and mOFC, as well as 
the pPL (Buhle et al. 2014; Ducharme, 2014; Gee et al., 2013; Newman et al., 2015; Silvers et 
al., 2015; 2016; Wager et al. 2008). The structural PFC cortical thickness clusters I found had 
significant overlap with the aforementioned functional emotion regulation network. To my 
knowledge, this is the first study to demonstrate that correlating subcortical grey matter structural 
volume (e.g., amygdala) with cortical thickness may be a parsimonious and useful method for 
exploring potential cortical regions related to emotion regulation. 
The contralateral analyses were more robust which was unexpected. These results were 
difficult to interpret given the dearth of literature examining the relationship between 
contralateral cortical areas that are associated with the amygdala and, presumably, related to 
emotion regulation. Despite these analyses being exploratory, the results were largely congruent 
with the ipsilateral analyses, as well as the larger emotion regulation literature. While this may 
be partially explained by the large correlation between an individual’s right/left amygdala 
volumes; however, if multicollinearity solely explained the contralateral effects it would be 
surprising for the results of the contralateral analyses to be more robust (i.e., larger effect size 
and more cortical regions identified). More research is needed on ipsilateral and contralateral 
cortical areas and their structural/functional connectivity with the amygdala as it relates to an 
individual being able to appropriately regulate his or her emotions.  
Consistent with some of the previous literature in pediatric samples examining the 
relationship between amygdala volume and self-reported anxiety (De Bellis et al., 2000), neither 
the right nor left amygdala were correlated with anxiety. When examining the correlation 
between mean cortical thickness in clusters found to be related to amygdala volume in the 





were significantly related to self-reported anxiety symptoms in youth. These findings provide 
support for the clusters related to amygdala volume as being important in emotion regulation. To 
my knowledge, this is the first study to demonstrate evidence that subcortical grey-matter 
volume correlates with regions of the cortex that are associated with emotion regulation.  
 
5.2. Interaction Analyses: Amygdala Volume and White Matter  
The current study attempted to provide further support for the notion that the amygdala and 
associated cortical structures were related to due to their connectivity, and therefore, important 
for the regulation of emotion. To this end, I provided partial support for my hypothesis that the 
relationship between amygdala volume and correlated individual cortical thickness clusters 
would be moderated by their structural connectivity. I decided a priori the UF and CG would 
serve as the tracts-of-interest, as they have been found to be perturbed in anxious samples (Abe 
et al., 2006; Bremner et al., 2004; Cannistraro et al., 2007; Chiu et al., 2011; Gilbertson et al., 
2001; Phan et a., 2009; Vasterling et al., 1998; Vasterling et al., 2002; Yehuda et al., 1995; Han 
et al., 2008; Yu et al., 2013) and play a role in fear extinction processes (Fani et al., 2014). My 
hypothesis that reduced volume and/or poor CG tract integrity may disrupt cognition and 
emotion regulation was only partially supported.  
In the right hemisphere, the volume of the UF significantly moderated the relationship 
between amygdala volume and cortical thickness of the SFG, SPL, and cuneus. CG volume was 
only found to moderate the relationship between amygdala volume and cortical thickness in the 
RMF/vlPFC. Interestingly, the most robust moderations were those with regions that are most 
consistently linked with emotion regulation in youth (Silvers et al., 2015, 2016). For instance, the 





cortical thickness were found to demonstrate the most robust moderating effects, consistent with 
a wealth of functional literature on regions important for emotion regulation (Buhle et al. 2014; 
Ducharme, 2014; Gee et al., 2013; Newman et al., 2015; Silvers et al., 2015; 2016; Wager et al. 
2008). The CG volume was the only tract variable that was significantly (negatively) related to 
anxiety symptoms. Counter to my hypothesis, neither UF volume nor the functional anisotropy 
were correlated with anxiety symptoms.  
 In the left hemisphere, ipsilateral analyses indicated that both the CG and UF volumes 
significantly moderated the relationship between amygdala volume and the OFC/vlPFC cortical 
thickness cluster, providing further support that the ipsilateral GLM analyses reflected that the 
amygdala volume (controlled for intracranial volume) was predicting cortical thickness clusters 
potentially due to their structural connectivity.  
The findings also indicate that tract volume, but not FA, may have a stronger effect on 
the relationship between amygdala volume and the PFC, as well as self-reported anxiety in 
youth. Models including tract volume, but not FA, were the only significant models. 
Additionally, only the mean volume of the CG was significantly (negatively) related to anxiety 
symptoms. However, these findings should be interpreted with caution as it may reflect that both 
variables of the interaction term are structural volumes (i.e., tract and amygdala volumes). Future 
research should continue to explore both the functional anisotropy and volume of the UF and CG 
tracts as my findings indicate that their volumes have a differential effect on the relationship 








5.3. Test of Indirect Effects 
A combination of previous inconsistent past literature, and the post-hoc suppression effect 
observed, I conducted an exploratory test of indirect effects. As noted in the introduction, the 
literature is equivocal on the association between amygdala volume and anxious 
symptomatology (De Bellis et al., 2000; Milham et al., 2005), with more recent research on 
cortical regions involved while youth regulate their emotional responses (Wager, Davidson, 
Hughes, & Lindquist, 2008; Buhle et al. 2014; Silvers et al., 2015; Silvers et al., 2016). 
Therefore, it was hypothesized that the relationship between right amygdala volume and self-
reported anxiety would be indirectly affected by right RMF/vlPFC, whereas the OFC/vlPFC/ 
rACC will have an indirect effect on the relationship between left amygdala volume and self-
reported anxiety. 
The exploratory analyses were conducted based on past research not taking into 
consideration the role of individual differences in top-down regulation may have one the 
relationship between amygdala volume and anxiety (De Bellis et al., 2000; Milham et al., 2005). 
I conducted these analyses because it was suspected that the relationship between amygdala 
volume and anxiety would strengthen due to the restricted variance of associated cortical 
thickness regions. I found partial support for this hypothesis: the left amygdala was indirectly 
related to self-reported anxiety through the mean thickness of the left lOFC/vlPFC. Specifically, 
the indirect effect of cortical thickness in the vlPFC significantly strengthened the correlation 
between left amygdala volume self-reported anxiety; while there was not a direct effect of 
amygdala volume and anxiety, as would be expected from the Pearson correlations (r = -.08), the 
inclusion of mean cortical thickness in the vlPFC led to a robust relationship between left 





Neurologically, the amygdala is a collection of nuclei, which is all captured by the single 
volume variable used to quantify the amygdala (Kim et al., 2011). It is well known that different 
nuclei of the amygdala serve various functions (e.g., sensory input and memory input), and it is 
not a unitary structure. Since the current study used the entire amygdala volume, capturing all 
nuclei, this may explain a portion of the results extending to many areas related, functionally, 
with emotion regulation. Studies parsing the neural correlates of certain aspects of the amygdala 
(i.e., lateral nucleus) would be particularly interesting. 
These results have important implications for future research. From a practical 
standpoint, conducting an MRI is much easier (especially with youth) and cheaper than 
functional imagining. The results of this dissertation suggest that volumetric cortical and 
subcortical grey-matter can be related to behavioral reports of anxiety. Moreover, many regions 
found to be related to emotion regulation are similar to those found in task-based functional 
neuroimaging studies. This method is much more parsimonious and efficient than other methods 
of examining the neural correlates of emotion regulation in youth. Additionally, many regions 
found in the current study overlap with a study using similar methodology; relating distinct 
facets of anxiety (i.e., apprehension and arousal) to cortical thickness in youth (Castagna et al., 
2017). The results also have particular relevance given the switch in positive-to-negative 
connectivity between the PFC and amygdala during development (e.g., Gee et al., 2013). There 
are many challenges to conducting a functional neuroimaging scan with a young child (e.g., 
excessive head movement, longer scan times, and low motivation to engage in the task). These 
findings suggest that research may benefit from examining individual differences in young 
children’s cortical and subcortical volumes, how they relate to emotion regulation, and how this 





overall exploratory hypothesis that the incongruent past research relating amygdala volume and 
anxiety may be due to not taking into consideration the restricted variance provided by individual 
differences in cortical regions that are found to be important for successful emotion regulation.  
In contrast to my hypothesis, the other models of indirect effects with clusters found to be 
related to right/left amygdala volume in the ipsilateral analyses were not significant, such as the 
cortical areas that are within the emotion regulation network: ventral PFC, dorsal PFC, lOFC, 
mOFC, and the pPL (Buhle et al. 2014; Ducharme, 2014; Gee et al., 2013; Newman et al., 2015; 
Silvers et al., 2015; 2016; Wager et al. 2008).  
 
5.4. Interaction Analyses: Amygdala Volume and Cortical Thickness 
In my follow-up analyses, I looked to provide more evidence that regions involved in emotion 
regulation have an indirect effect on the relationship between amygdala volume and anxiety by 
demonstrating that the interaction between amygdala volume and associated cortical regions 
were not predictive of self-reported anxiety. The overall aim was to demonstrate that it is 
unlikely that amygdala volume has a differential effect with emotion regulation as a function of 
individual differences (variance) in cortical thickness in significant areas of the PFC. I found 
support for my hypotheses that these models would not be significant, which indicated that the 
relationship between amygdala volume and emotion regulation did not become stronger or 
weaker as a function of youth’s variability in PFC cortical thickness. Congruent with my 
hypotheses, the relationship between amygdala volume and anxiety symptoms was indirectly 
affected by the variance explained by cortical thickness, where the regions appear to work as a 






5.5. Evidence for a Two-System Framework of Emotion Regulation 
The overall findings were directed at exploring whether there is evidence for a two-system 
framework of emotion regulation that scaffolds off of two similar theories of emotional 
consciousness (LeDoux & Brown, 2017) and popular frameworks of fear/anxiety (LeDoux & 
Pine, 2016). The central theoretical hypothesis was that emotional consciousness – being self-
aware that you are currently in a particular emotional state (i.e., you are aware you are in a 
certain emotional state) – and emotion regulation share the same underlying brain mechanisms. 
In addition, it was hypothesized that the more appropriate dichotomy between non-adaptive and 
adaptive emotion regulation is better captured by whether a particular emotion regulation 
strategy is unconscious (type-one) and conscious (type-two), respectively. It was posited that the 
differences between emotional consciousness and emotion regulation function as differences in 
the recruitment of lower-order, subcortical networks and their interpretation by higher-order 
structures (e.g., PFC cortical thickness).  
I provide partial evidence for this hypothesis that suggest an extension of LeDoux and 
Pine’s (2016) two-system framework of fear/anxiety to one of emotion regulation is feasible. I 
found support for the specific circuits within the network as being type-one emotion regulation – 
often called emotion reactivity/responsivity/sensitivity – and type-two emotion regulation (i.e., 
effortful strategies). The purpose of exploring LeDoux and Pine’s (2016) two-system framework 
of fear/anxiety and LeDoux and Brown’s (2017) higher-order theory of consciousness was to 
scaffold off dominate theories of emotional processing (i.e., LeDoux & Brown, 2017; LeDoux & 







5.6. Results of the Theoretical Hypotheses 
Although broad structures are mentioned by LeDoux et al. (2016; 2017), as shown in Figure 
1.2B, the theorized neural circuits or substructures which comprise the general network of 
cognitions (type one and two) are not fundamentally different than those involved in type-two 
(and type-one) emotion regulation was largely supported. Briefly, a review of the literature was 
congruent with my findings, supporting the notion that the GNC-2 and type-two emotion 
regulation strategies heavily rely on the dlPFC, vlPFC, dmPFC cortices, as well as the dACC, 
aIN, and portions of the OFC. On the other hand, I provide preliminary evidence that the GNC-1 
and type-one emotion regulation may be supported by the vmPFC, portions of the OFC, 
amygdala nuclei, and pIN.  
 
5.7. The General Network of Cognition and Emotion Regulation 
Hypotheses were driven by neuroimaging studies of these emotion regulation strategies (e.g., 
Otto, Misra, Prasad, & McRae 2014; Zilverstand, Parvaz, & Goldstein, 2017) map on to the 
GNC outlined by Ledoux and Brown (2017), where the various strategies differ only on lower-
order, subcortical input. As seen in Figure 1.2AB, my results largely support the broader 
literature, implicating the pPL, IN, ACC, and a number of areas in the PFC (i.e., ventral-lateral, 
dorsal-lateral, orbital-lateral, orbital-medial, dorsal-medial, and ventral-medial). In terms of 
functional neuroimaging, these same regions are involved in type-two emotion regulation 
strategies such as, cognitive reappraisal (Zilverstand et al., 2017), active suppression (Goldin et 
al., 2008; Wyland et al., 2003), as well as type-one regulatory processes such as the initiation of 
defensive behaviors (e.g., Mogenson, Jones, & Yim, 1980), rumination (Cooney, Joormann, 





Further evidence comes from the structural (i.e., cortical thickness, subcortical volumes) 
differences (and overlap) found between self-reported anxious apprehension (largely mapping on 
to type-two emotion regulation strategies such as worry) and anxious arousal (capturing type-one 
defensive behaviors/changes in physiology). In line with structures comprising the GNC, anxious 
apprehension, but not anxious arousal, correlated with clusters in the dlPFC, dmPFC and vlPFC, 
whereas anxious arousal, but not anxious apprehension, produced clusters in the aIN and the 
amygdala (Castagna et al., 2017), again, congruent with the two-system framework of 
fear/anxiety (LeDoux & Pine, 2016). Interestingly, a conjunction analysis revealed the 
importance of a number of frontoparietal regions with strong relationships to both systems 
(Castagna et al., 2017). The overlap among the GNC and regions involved in emotion regulation, 
broadly, is fairly evident; however, my aim is to extend LeDoux and Brown’s (2017) distinction 
between GNC-1 and GNC-2. Support for the first hypothesis was partially provided by 
demonstrating that the neural regions or substructures which comprise GNC-2 (and GNC-1) may 
not fundamentally different than those involved in type-two (and type-one) emotion regulation, 
given their relationship within the test of indirect effects and relationship to anxiety symptoms 
 
5.8. The Two-System Neuroscience Framework of Fear  
In brief, the two-system neuroscience framework of fear provides evidence for the 
distinction and independence between the two threat systems. The first-system is thought to be 
primarily subcortical (e.g., sensory system, amygdala, bed nucleus of the stria terminalis, and 
striatum), leading to behavioral responses (i.e., the nucleus accumbens facilitating escape and 





Dymond, 2013) and accompany physiological changes in the brain and body – type-one, 
automatic, and non-effortful, termed defensive behaviors (i.e., DFN).  
The second system is posited to be an independent, higher-order cortical system that 
facilitates the subjective experience of emotion depending on the subcortical input (e.g., DFN). 
Specifically, they suggest that the general network of cognition (GNC), which gives rise to 
perceptual (non-emotional) conscious experience (Craig, 2009; Dehaene, Changeux, Naccache, 
Sackur, & Sergent, 2006; Frith & Dolan, 1996; Frifth, Perry, & Lumer, 1999; Lau & 
Passingham, 2006; Naccache et al., 2002; Rees & Frith, 2007), is not fundamentally different 
than the network that facilitates emotionally conscious experience; differing on lower-order, 
subcortical input (e.g., DFN). The current study extends the reach of the GNC by providing 
evidence of its overlap with regions important in emotion regulation (see Figure 1.2A). The 
evidence I provide for the independence of the two-systems (e.g., DFN and GNC) framework 
comes from a number of areas of research and parallels the distinction between type-one 
(unconscious) and type-two (consciousness) emotion regulation.  
 
5.9. The Higher-Order Theory of Consciousness (LeDoux & Brown, 2017) 
LeDoux and Brown’s (2017) higher-order theory of emotional consciousness suggests 
that the subcortical regions that receive primary sensory signals from the body (Damasio, 1999), 
memory systems (Squire & Zola-Morgan, 1991), and the visual system (Van Essen, Anderson, & 
Felleman, 1992) are all involved in the first-order representations that indirectly influence 
higher-order assembly of conscious feelings by a GNC. Thus, the subjective experience of fear, 
within this framework, is modulated by the DFN, along with the subcortical body sensing 





frontoparietal networks integrating the information (i.e., the GNC). Consistent with the central 
hypothesis, I found support for the same regions LeDoux and Brown (2017) posit as being 
important for the two respective GNCs: a first GNC is thought to integrate subcortical input 
outside of an individuals’ conscious awareness, and a second GNC that receives this input and 
gives rise to the conscious experience of fear. 
Taken together, the current findings largely support the notion that perceptual (non-
emotional) and emotional consciousness both require the incorporation of higher-order 
representation (i.e., involving cortical regions of the PFC) of lower, subcortical information (i.e., 
involving individual differences in amygdala volume) by the GNC; differences in consciousness 
(non-emotional and emotional) arise from the subcortical input and higher-order representation. 
Extendedly, this would suggest that LeDoux and Brown (2016) are may be correct in 
hypothesizing that one can report having an emotional experience when asked (i.e., self-report 
being scared), when a higher-order representation of the first higher-order representation is 
created. They posit that the higher-order representations are integrated by the GNC, which fits 
directly with the finding that the test of indirect effects, but not the interaction, significantly 
predicted youth’s self-reported anxiety.  
 
5.10. Limitations and Future Considerations 
 The sample includes a broad age range, and although age and sex were used as covariates 
in all analyses, these results cannot extend to certain developmental periods. Independent-
samples t-test did not indicate significant differences in younger youth (i.e., aged 10-13) and 
older youth (i.e., aged 14-17) on their reporting of their anxiety symptoms, t(33) = -1.02, p > .05; 





along with different cognitive and self-reflective capacity, compared to older youth, and is a 
limitation of the current study. Moreover, the study was also cross-sectional, which does not 
allow for a developmental course of events to be examined. The results are also derived from 
typically developing youth, thus, it is unclear how this relationship might look in clinical 
populations of youth. Nevertheless, the study demonstrates that amygdala grey matter volume 
predicts clusters of cortical thickness grey-matter, where most clusters demonstrated significant 
relationships with self-reported anxiety and significantly overlap with the larger literature on 
regions important for successful emotion regulation in youth. While I attempted to control for 
multiple comparisons with MCS, a limitation of the current study involves the number of 
analyses conducted.  
 The current study has a number of strengths as well. Evidence for relating subcortical 
amygdala volume with cortical thickness, while providing preliminary evidence that they are 
associated due to their connectivity, is novel. Structural imaging is less burdensome than 
collecting functional data, and therefore, the methodology may be beneficial to future researchers 
to replicate and extend the results to younger children and adults. As previously mentioned, 
functional studies may benefit from a better understanding of contralateral top-down emotion 
regulation, as the results tentatively suggest that contralateral cortical regulation may be 
important during the emotion generative process. This study presents a foundation in a 
potentially convenient method of examine emotion regulation with structural imaging relating 
cortical and subcortical grey matter, as well as proving preliminary evidence potentially 
extending two major theories in the field of emotional processing (LeDoux & Brown, 2016; 
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